In a somewhat ironic twist on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) usual position, on March 26, 2018, FAA ruled in favor of the Town of East Hampton, New York (“Town”), proprietor of the East Hampton Airport, in a challenge by the National Business Aviation Association (“NBAA”) under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. Part 16, to the expenditure of airport revenues in defense of the Town’s self-imposed airport noise and access restrictions.

The origin of that determination is equally anomalous.  In or about 2015, the Town enacted three local laws limiting aircraft noise at the airport, including restriction on: (1) access by “noisy” aircraft to only one arrival and departure per week; (2) mandatory nighttime curfew from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; and (3) an extended curfew from 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. on “noisy” aircraft.  
 
These local restrictions, however, directly contravene federal law set forth in the Airport Noise and Capacity Act, 49 U.S.C. § 47521, et seq. (“ANCA”) which has, since 1990, affirmatively preempted local laws which impose: “(A) a restriction on noise levels generated on either a single event or cumulative basis; . . . (D) a restriction on hours of operation.”  49 U.S.C. § 47524(c)(A) and (D).  Predictably, East Hampton’s local regulations were successfully challenged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  Ultimately, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, seeking to overturn the Second Circuit’s determination, brought by the Town in the United States Supreme Court, was met with an equal lack of success, despite the Town’s powerful ally, the City of New York.  
 
Apparently, in a last ditch attempt to thwart any future initiatives to enact similar restrictions, the NBAA brought its fight to the FAA.  The gravamen of NBAA’s challenge was the Town’s alleged violation of its contractual obligation (as airport operator) to FAA pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 47107(k), prohibiting “illegal diversion of airport revenue.”  That section includes, among other things, “(A) direct payments or indirect payments, other than payments reflecting the value of services and facilities provided to the airport.”  49 U.S.C. § 47107(k)(2)(A), see also 49 U.S.C. § 47017(b).  
 

Continue Reading FAA Supports the Right of Airport Sponsor to Use Airport Funds in Defense of Locally Enacted Noise Restrictions

On November 1, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit handed down a sweeping victory for Buchalter’s client Bonner County, owner and operator of Sandpoint Airport in Sandpoint, Idaho.
 
The airport was sued in 2012 by real estate developer SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC for actions the county took in order to achieve compliance with federal aviation regulations and specific safety directives from the Federal Aviation Administration.  SilverWing sought tens of millions of dollars in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged inverse condemnation and violation of equal protection in addition to a state law claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising from a “through-the-fence” access agreement.
 
After prevailing on summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, Buchalter’s Aviation Practice Group, led by attorneys Barbara Lichman and Paul Fraidenburgh, won a complete victory in the Ninth Circuit on every issue across the board, including the affirmance of an attorney fee and cost award totaling almost $800,000 (which is likely to increase after appellate fees and costs are added).
 
With respect to the preempted state law claim, the Ninth Circuit held: 

Continue Reading Buchalter’s Aviation Group Wins Major Victory in Ninth Circuit

Tweed-New Haven Airport, seeking to extend its 5,600 foot runway to 7,200 feet, has run into an unexpected roadblock.  A Federal Magistrate in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has determined that Connecticut’s Gen. Stat. 15-120j(c) (providing, in part, that “[r]unway 2/20 of the airport shall not exceed the existing paved runway length of five thousand six hundred linear feet”), is not preempted by federal law.  Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. George Jepsen, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Case No. 3:15cv01731(RAR).  The Magistrate concludes that the state statute “does not interfere with plaintiff’s ability to comply with federal aviation safety standards,” because: (1) the “Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the runway length in this instance is a component part of the field of airline safety,” and, thus, does not violate the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101, et seq., Memorandum of Decision, p. 39; (2) the statute is not expressly preempted by the provision of the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”) (49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)) that “prohibits states from enforcing any law ‘relating to rates, routes, or services’ of any air carrier,” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992), because the Connecticut statute does not “relate[] to rates, routes or services [of airlines],” Memorandum of Decision, p. 43; and (3) the Airport and Airway Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 47101, et seq. (“AAIA”), “does not impose any requirements or authorize the promulgation of federal regulations, unless funding is being sought,” Memorandum of Decision, p. 47.  

The Court’s decision contravenes the plain face of the FAA Act for the following reasons:  

Continue Reading Connecticut State Statute Limiting the Length of the Runway at Tweed-New Haven Airport Resists Federal Preemption Challenge

On April 19, 2016, the full Senate of the United States passed the “Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2016” (“FAA Act”), which had been previously passed by the full House of Representatives in February, 2016.  The FAA Act contains several notable provisions, the first of which, Section 2142, regarding federal preemption of local drone regulations, was approved by the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee on March 17, 2016, and reported in this publication on March 31.  

The FAA Act, as finally approved by the Senate, devotes substantial additional space to unmanned aircraft systems (“UAS”), and, most notably for this purpose, Section 2141, “Carriage of Property by Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Compensation or Hire.”  (Section 2141 will be codified in the main body of the legislation at Section 44812.)  That provision was clearly authored by Amazon, which has made considerable noise about the capability of UAS to deliver its products expeditiously and at low cost.  The FAA Act gives the Secretary of Transportation two years to issue a final rule authorizing the carrying of property by operations of small UAS within the United States.  
 
The requirement for the contents of the final rule is, however, clearly specified in the Act.  
 

Continue Reading Senate Bill Approves Package Delivery by Drone

On March 17, 2016, the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee of the United States Senate approved amendments to the most recent funding legislation for the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2016, that, among other things, appear to preempt to preempt local and state efforts to regulate the operation of unmanned aircraft systems (“UAS” or “drones”).  

Federal preemption is the displacement of state and local laws which seek to govern some aspect of a responsibility that Congress views as assigned by the Constitution exclusively to the federal government.  Preemption by statute is not uncommon in legislation dealing with transportation, and its relationship to interstate commerce.  For example, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41713, specifically “preempts” local attempts to control “prices, routes and service” of commercial air carriers by local operators or jurisdictions.  Similarly, the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990, 49 U.S.C. § 47521, et seq. (“ANCA”) preempts local efforts to establish airport noise or access restrictions.  The Senate’s current amendments, however, appear, at the same time, broader in scope, and more constrained by exceptions than previous legislative efforts.  They also hit closer to home for the average American concerned about the impact on daily life of the proliferation of UAS for all uses, including, but not limited to, the delivery of packages.  
 

Continue Reading Senate Version of Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Preempts Local Drone Regulations

Less than a month ago, it seemed clear that privatization was the wave of the future for the United States Air Traffic Control System (“ATC System”).  On February 19, 2016, the United States House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee approved the Aviation Innovation, Reform and Reauthorization Act (“H.R. 4441” or “FAA Reauthorization Act”), the centerpiece of which was the establishment of an independent, nonprofit, private corporation to modernize the U.S. ATC System and provide ongoing ATC services.  The benefits of such “privatization” were seen to include less expense, less backlog in the implementation of air traffic control revisions, in essence, greater efficiency in the development, implementation, and long-term operation of the ATC System.  Central questions still remain, however, concerning the synergy of a private corporation’s management of the ATC System with the overarching statutory regime by which it is currently governed.  

Continue Reading Privatization of the United States Air Traffic Control System Hits Roadblock in the U.S. Senate

In a surprising decision, Surface Transportation Board Decision, Docket No. FD35861, December 12, 2014 (“Docket”), the Federal Surface Transportation Board (“Board”) ruled that the application of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000, et seq., to the 114 mile high-speed passenger rail line between Fresno and Bakersfield, California is preempted in its entirety by federal law.  The Board’s decision is not only surprising in the context of prevailing legal authority, but also potentially important in the context of other modes of transportation.  

The decision is surprising because it went far beyond the scope of the petition filed by the responsible State agency, the California High-Speed Rail Authority (“Authority”).  The Authority asked only that the Board find that injunctive relief as a remedy under CEQA is foreclosed as preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), Pub.L. 104–88, 104th Congress, and is, thus, barred under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) which gives the Board jurisdiction over “the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State,” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2).  The Authority further argued that, as it had completed CEQA review in May 2014, the Board need not address whether CEQA is generally preempted, but need only address whether injunctive relief resulting in a work stoppage is available as a remedy in the lawsuits filed against the Authority.
 
Despite the Authority’s limited petition, the Board expanded its ruling to include a finding that § 10501(b) prevents the states and localities from intruding into matters that are “directly regulated by the Board (e.g., rail carrier rates, services, construction, and abandonment),” Docket, p. 8, and from “imposing requirements that, by their nature, could be used to deny a rail carrier’s ability to conduct rail operations.”  Id.  The Board employs the rationale that “Section 10501(b) [ ] is intended to prevent a patchwork of local regulation from unreasonably interfering with interstate commerce.”  Id.  
 
The Board recognizes, however, that “[n]ot all state and local regulations that affect rail carriers are preempted by § 10501(b).”  Id. at p. 9.  It acknowledges further that “State and local regulation is appropriate where it does not interfere with rail operations,” Id., and that “[l]ocalities retain their reserved police powers to protect the public health and safety so long as their actions do not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.”  Id.  
 
On that basis, and ignoring that “states and towns may exercise their traditional police powers . . . to the extent that the regulations ‘protect public health and safety, are settled and defined, can be obeyed with reasonable certainty, entail no extended or open-ended delays, and can be approved (or rejected) without the exercise of discretion on subjective questions,’” Id. citing Green Mountain v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2nd Cir. 2005), the Board concluded that CEQA was categorically preempted as a “state preclearance requirement that, by its very nature, could be used to deny or significantly delay an entity’s right to construct a line that the Board has specifically authorized, thus impinging upon the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction over rail transportation,” Docket, p. 10, citing DesertXpress Enters., LLC-Pet. For Declaratory Order, slip op. at 5.  The Board further found that CEQA lawsuits “can regulate rail transportation just as effectively as a state statute or regulation.”  Id. at 14, citing, inter alia, Maynard v. CSX Transp., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 2d 836, 840 (E.D. Ky. 2004) [explaining that common law suits constitute regulations].  
 
The Board decision, however, appears to be based on two fundamental misconceptions. 
 

Continue Reading The Federal Surface Transportation Board Finds California Environmental Quality Act Preempted as Applied to High-Speed Rail Projects

The decision of the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Idaho in SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner County, a case that has been “hanging fire” for almost two years, was worth the wait.  On Friday, November 21, 2014, the Court granted Defendant Bonner County (“Bonner County”) summary judgment on all Plaintiff SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC’s (“SilverWing”) federal claims for inverse condemnation, or “taking,” of private property by a public entity without just compensation, in violation of the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.  See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).  In addition, the Court granted summary judgment on SilverWing’s state law contract claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   

In this case, SilverWing claimed that Bonner County had taken its property by implementing a plan for the airport, an Airport Layout Plan (“ALP”) approved in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), that showed the single runway at Sandpoint Airport moving 60 feet to the west, toward SilverWing’s property.  SilverWing argued that forcing the movement of a taxiway that already been constructed to service the “hangar homes” in the development, and thus causing it to incur upon the five lots closest to the runway, making them unbuildable, caused a loss to SilverWing of $26 million.  The Court ruled that implementation of the requirements of the ALP was a federal requirement arising out of federal responsibility for aviation safety and not within the discretion of Bonner County.  
 

Continue Reading Bonner County Wins Major Victory in Property Owner’s “Takings” Lawsuit

In a rare showing of unanimity between airport operator and noise impacted community, on September 30, 2014 the Board of Supervisors of Orange County, California (“Board”) approved the extension, for an additional 15 years, of a long-standing set of noise restrictions on the operation of John Wayne Airport (“Airport”), of which the Board is also the operator.  Those restrictions include: (1) limitation on the number of the noisiest aircraft that can operate at the Airport; (2) limitation on the number of passengers that can use the Airport annually; (3) limitation on the number of aircraft loading bridges; and, perhaps most important, (4) limitation on the hours of aircraft operation (10:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on weekdays and 8:00 a.m. on Sundays).   

The restrictions were originally imposed in settlement of a lawsuit in 1986, between the Board, the neighboring City of Newport Beach and two environmental organizations, the Airport Working Group of Orange County, Inc. and Stop Polluting Our Newport.  The obvious question is whether similar restrictions might be achieved at other airports today. The not so obvious answer is that such a resolution is far more difficult now, but not impossible.
 

Continue Reading One Community Gets Relief from Aircraft Noise

The Santa Monica Airport Commission has recently made a proposal to limit access of certain aircraft to Santa Monica Airport by limiting emissions allowable from those aircraft.  The proposal may be public spirited in its intent, but shocking in its naiveté with respect to the preemptive authority of federal law and specifically the federal authority over emissions from aircraft engines. 

The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) is granted by Congress exclusive jurisdiction over the creation and enforcement of regulations governing emissions from aircraft engines.  “The Administrator shall, from time to time, issue proposed emission standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of aircraft engines which in his judgment causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.”  42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A) and (a)(3).  There are, however, some limits on EPA’s authority.
 

Continue Reading Santa Monica Airport Commission’s Proposal to Limit Aircraft Access by Limiting Emissions is Foreclosed by Federal Law