“The FAA preempts the fields of ‘aviation safety,’ Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007), and ‘aircraft operations,’ Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Los Angeles, 979 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992). When the County’s airport was found to be in noncompliance by the FAA, due to specific safety and operations concerns with SilverWing’s development, the FAA required the County to implement a Corrective Action Plan (“CAP”). The CAP included limiting future residential access to the airport and pursuing alternatives to the current ‘through-the-fence’ arrangements, which allowed airplanes to access the municipal airport from SilverWing’s land. It was not the County which frustrated SilverWing’s plans; it was the FAA. Thus, SilverWing’s claim is preempted.”
“SilverWing’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail. Although the County, in voting to submit a new Airport Layout Plan (“ALP”) to the FAA, took official action to ensure the airport’s compliance with federal law, the ‘moving force’ behind the action was the FAA’s requirement that the County change the airport’s ALP. Thus, the challenged conduct was not pursuant to any County ‘policy or custom’ and cannot serve as the basis for a § 1983 lawsuit. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
“The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Rule 54(d)(1) costs and attorney’s fees to the County. The County is a ‘prevailing party’ within the meaning of Rule 54(d)(1) because it obtained a judgment with respect to all of SilverWing’s claims except the one ultimately remanded to state court. San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Emps. Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 741 (9th Cir. 2009). As such, it is entitled to costs unless SilverWing can show why a cost award would be ‘inappropriate or inequitable.’ Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). No such showing has been made here. Furthermore, the ‘through-the-fence’ agreement between the parties provided that attorney’s fees were to be awarded to the party deserving of costs in any action brought ‘to enforce’ the agreement. Because the § 1983 claims were brought, at least in part, to enforce the ‘through-the-fence’ agreement, it was not error for the court to award fees also for those claims.