In an unusual divergence of opinion between aviation related organizations concerning progress in the operation and development of the national air traffic system, the Airline Owners and Pilots Association (“AOPA”), the nationwide organization of private aircraft owners, opposes the plan set forth in the 21st Century Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act, H.R. 2997 (“AIRR Act”).  That plan calls for the air traffic control (“ATC”) system currently managed by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) to be removed from federal government control, and turned over to a 13 member, largely private, board, the dominant members of which are the nation’s commercial airlines.  See § 90305.  

The apparent rationale behind the shift, heavily supported by the commercial airline industry, is the consistent delays and resulting costs in fuel and efficiency that have been endemic to the ground based radar air traffic control system in effect since World War II.  The airline industry maintains that insufficient progress has been made in expediting operations to accommodate the increasing number of operations in the United States airspace.  The commercial airlines’ position is supported by the legislative purpose which is “to provide for more efficient operations and improvement of air traffic services.”  See § 201.  
 
AOPA, on the other hand, relies on examples of the disputed improvements in system management which it maintains undercut the airline industry rationale for pursuing privatization.  

Continue Reading The Privatization of Air Traffic Control Vigorously Opposed by General Aviation Groups

Up against a September 30th deadline for the passage of legislation before its recess, Congressman Bud Shuster introduced the 21st Century Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act (“21st Century AIRR Act” or “Act”), H.R. 2997.  Although somewhat obscured by its name and size (in excess of 200 pages), one of the central points of the Bill is the transfer of air traffic control responsibility from the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) to a private sector corporation (“Corporation), i.e., privatization of the air traffic control system.  The Bill betrays the speed of its development through its lack of specificity on a number of critical issues.

Continue Reading Congress’ Attempt to Transfer Air Traffic Control to a Private Corporation Leaves a Great Deal to the Imagination

The integration of cutting-edge aviation technology such as commercial drones and the modernization of our national airspace system are just a couple of the pressing aviation issues hanging in the balance this summer as Congress seeks common ground on FAA Reauthorization legislation.  

With the July 15, 2016 expiration of the current Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) authorization legislation rapidly approaching, congressional disagreement over a plan to privatize Air Traffic Control is preventing bicameral endorsement of a path forward.  
 
On April 19, 2016, the Senate passed its Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization legislation by an overwhelming margin of 95-3 (initially introduced as S. 2658 and later merged into H.R. 636). The Senate’s FAA legislation would reauthorize FAA programs through September 2017, and would focus billions of dollars and government resources on some of the most pressing aviation issues including the promotion of widespread commercial drone operations, bolstering airport security, and adding new safety systems in private aircraft. However, the Senate’s FAA Reauthorization legislation is arguably more notable for what it would not do than for what it would do. 
 

Continue Reading Congressional Stalemate Persists over Air Traffic Control Privatization as FAA Reauthorization Deadline Approaches

Less than a month ago, it seemed clear that privatization was the wave of the future for the United States Air Traffic Control System (“ATC System”).  On February 19, 2016, the United States House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee approved the Aviation Innovation, Reform and Reauthorization Act (“H.R. 4441” or “FAA Reauthorization Act”), the centerpiece of which was the establishment of an independent, nonprofit, private corporation to modernize the U.S. ATC System and provide ongoing ATC services.  The benefits of such “privatization” were seen to include less expense, less backlog in the implementation of air traffic control revisions, in essence, greater efficiency in the development, implementation, and long-term operation of the ATC System.  Central questions still remain, however, concerning the synergy of a private corporation’s management of the ATC System with the overarching statutory regime by which it is currently governed.  

Continue Reading Privatization of the United States Air Traffic Control System Hits Roadblock in the U.S. Senate

In a marked change in longtime Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) policy regarding analysis of noise and air quality impacts from FAA initiated, directed or funded projects, FAA has substituted a single new model for the long mandated Integrated Noise Model (“INM”) and Emissions and Dispersion Modeling System (“EDMS”).  Beginning May 29, 2015, FAA policy “requires” the use of the Aviation Environmental Design Tool version 2b (“AEDT 2b”), which integrates analysis of aircraft noise, air pollutant emissions, and fuel burn.  These impacts, according to FAA are “interdependent and occur simultaneously throughout all phases of flight.”  80 Fed.Reg. 27853.  

 
The FAA policy provides for differential displacement of existing analytic models.  For air traffic and airspace procedural changes, AEDT 2b replaces AEDT 2a, already in use.  For other, ground based projects, AEDT 2b replaces both the INM, for analyzing aircraft noise, and EDMS for developing emissions inventories and modeling emissions dispersion.  The change was presaged by FAA Administrator Michael Huerta who announced in April that FAA was undertaking an “ambitious project” to revamp its approach to measuring noise.  The “ambitious project” was apparently inspired by the vocal objections to the results of the analysis using current methodologies, voiced by citizens of locals that have experienced the effects of FAA’s current, nationwide reorganization of airspace around major airports to institute procedures based on Performance Based Navigation (“PBN”).  
 

Continue Reading FAA Requires New Integrated Model for Noise and Air Quality Impact Analysis

Taking its queue from the legislature (see Senate Bill 743 [Steinberg 2013]), the California Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (“OPR”) published, on August 6, 2014, a preliminary discussion draft of revisions to OPR’s California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) Guidelines, which serve as regulations implementing CEQA, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000, et seq.,  “Updating Transportation Impacts Analysis in the CEQA Guidelines” (“Update”).  The Update revises existing CEQA Guidelines § 15064.3 to comport with Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21099(b)(1) which establishes new criteria for determining the environmental significance of surface traffic impacts such as traffic delay and increased emissions resulting from a proposed project.  The purpose of both the amended statute and the Update is to shift the focus of the CEQA analysis of significance from “driver delay” to “reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, creation of multi-modal  networks and promotion of mixed land uses.”  Update, page 3.  

 
The change is effected through a change in the metric for determining environmental significance Level of Service (“LOS”), which measures delay at intersections, to vehicle miles traveled (“VMT”), which is a measure of the number of automobile trips resulting from the project.  The stated rationale underlying the change is that the use of LOS encourages mitigation aimed at reducing delays by increasing traffic flow, including expanded roadways, construction of more lanes and other automobile traffic facilitation measures; which theoretically leads to “induced demand,” i.e., more capacity at intersections allowing additional cars to use them; and, ultimately, to more air quality and greenhouse gas impacts from those additional cars.  As the story goes, a standard of environmental significance based on VMT will encourage the use of mitigation measures such as increased bicycle paths, accommodations for pedestrians, and other measures that will reduce automobile ridership in the long term.  The problem is that the theory underlying the Update is made up more of holes than of cheese. 
 

Continue Reading California Changes the Test of Significance for Traffic Impacts Under CEQA

Noise abatement procedures are only effective if they are used. Noise impacted communities are frequently heard to complain that, despite the complex, time consuming and expensive process needed to develop and implement noise abatement procedures at airports, either through the FAA’s Part 150 process, or through other airport specific processes, airlines seem to ignore them. The rationale often provided is that each airline is entitled to develop and implement its own flight procedures, some, but not all of which incorporate the specified noise abatement procedures. This situation was exacerbated in 1990 when the Airport Noise and Capacity Act, 49 U.S.C. § 47521, et seq., took noise abatement policy making out of the hands of local airports and placed approval authority exclusively in the hands of the FAA.

A deceptively simple solution to this pervasive problem of airlines non-uniform observance of airport specific noise abatement policies has been developed by a small, new company in Truckee, California, Whispertrack.
 

Continue Reading A New Technological Fix Hopes to Make Airport Noise a “Whisper”

The City of Los Angeles (“Los Angeles”) went on record yet again, rebuffing a cooperative effort between the City of Ontario (“Ontario”) and County of San Bernardino (“San Bernardino”) to promote growth at Ontario International Airport (“ONT”). The Los Angeles City Council formally voted to oppose SB466, introduced earlier this year by Senator Bob Dutton, which would allow for structured negotiations regarding the transfer of ONT to a newly formed joint powers agency comprised of Ontario and San Bernardino. The rationale for the legislation is that ONT has proportionally suffered the worst loss of passengers and airline operations of any airport in the Southern California region, and that a shift to local control is needed to restart what had previously been considered the economic engine for the Inland Empire.

Continue Reading City of Los Angeles Opposes Legislative Efforts to Encourage Growth at Ontario

A recently announced plan by the San Bernardino County Association of Governments (SANBAG) to convert carpool lanes on the 10 and 15 freeways to toll lanes will not realize the proposal’s intended purpose, i.e., to reduce traffic in the carpool lanes. Rather, it will temporarily serve to push freeway carpool lane traffic out of the carpool “frying pan” into the main lanes “fire.”

 

Continue Reading Proposed Carpool Lane Tolls in San Bernardino Won’t Reduce Traffic

When the FAA sought approval of the "STAAV4" or "Right Turn" Departure Procedure at McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas, Nevada, it opined that the new route would decrease delays dramatically at McCarran.  Indeed, the FAA stated that reduction of delays was one of the primary purposes of instituting the departure procedure, which routes aircraft over thousands more people than the old departure route.

It has now been a year since the FAA first implemented the departure procedure.  And the results are?  Judging from the statistics that the FAA keeps and makes available to the public on its "OPSNET" system, the new departure procedure is a flop:

  • Total number of delays at McCarran increased by 1,083 in the year since implementation of the procedure, representing a 7.0% increase over the prior year;
  • Over the year since implementation, aircraft spent an additional 101,934 minutes in delay, representing a 23.3% increase over the prior year;

(For a complete comparison of the numbers click here).  The explanation for an increase in delays cannot be that there was a large increase in operations, since operations increased by only 1,868, which represents a 0.3% increase in operations. Nor can bad weather explain the increase in delays, since weather related delays dropped by 808 during the year.  About the only bright spot for the FAA was a decrease in "runway" delays of 155 (a decrease of 1.65%).  But this is more than offset by whopping increases in "terminal volume" delays of 1,565 (an increase of 327%) and "Other" delays of 545 (a 229% increase).

If there was no decrease in delays, why was a procedure instituted that routed aircraft over thousands more people than before, subjecting them to an increase in noise and air pollution?