The GAO released its Report to Congressional Committees on the FAA’s "Voluntary Airport Low Emissions" (VALE) program on November 10, 2008.  Entitled Aviation and the Environment:  Initial Voluntary Low Emissions Program Projects Reduce Emissions, and FAA Plans to Assess the Program’s Overall Performance as Participation Increases, the GAO reports on how the VALE has been implemented and the outcomes attributable to it.

In 2003, Congress established VALE to reduce airport ground emissions at commercial service airports in areas failing to meet or maintain air quality standards.  FAA administers the program and provides funding for it through Airport Improvement Program grants or Passenger Facility Charges.  Participating airports receive credits for the emission reductions achieved through VALE projects.  Airports can then use these credits to offset emissions resulting from development projects to comply with federal Clean Air Act requirements.

The GAO reports that as of September, 2008, only 9 of the 160 airports that were eligible had or were planning to initiate a VALE project.  Those airports are:

  • Bush Intercontinental Airport, Houston, TX
  • Hobby Airport, Houston, TX
  • Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Detroit, MI
  • Erie International Airport, Erie, PA
  • Greater Rochester International Airport, Rochester, NY
  • Albany International Airport, Albany, NY
  • Stewart International Airport, Newburgh, NY
  • Westchester County Airport, White Plains, NY
  • Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, PA

Although FAA expects participation in VALE to increase as more airports become familiar with the program, GAO reported that non-participating airports stated they were aware of the program, but did not want to participate.  One reason for the lack of participation is that some airports have a misperception that VALE projects compete with other projects for AIP funding, thereby limiting the funds an airport could receive for other projects.  VALE projects, however, are funded through discretionary AIP set-aside for noise and emission projects.

This is not to say that VALE is not without success. Houston Hobby Airport and Bush Intercontinental Airport have both taken advantage of the program to obtain emission credits for planned construction projects.  Likewise, Philadelphia International Airport plans to use the program to satsify CAA conformity requirements to offset emissions produced in the constructionof its ongoing capacity enhancement project.

Despite the marked lack of participation, FAA seeks to use VALE as a "new model for government efforts to promote clean fuels and technology."  For this reason, the FAA and the GAO point out that EPA is recommending in current proposed revisions to its General Conformity Regulations that the VALE system for granting emissions credits be expanded to all action subject to General Conformity Regulations.

Related articles and documents:

 

Anyone who has recently traveled for business, read the business section of the local newspaper, or watched CNN knows that the airline industry is in dire economic straits.  Pundits typically attribute that weakness to increased fuel prices.  But the reality is that the deterioration began at almost the same time as the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 and results from at least two major factors:  (1) predatory competition pitting legacy carriers against startups; and (2) the airlines’ flawed business model which depends on "hubbing," an expensive process of concentrating resources in a few locations to aggregate as much demand as possible (versus "point to point" operations, a model used consistently and successfully for the entire period since the advent of deregulation).

The Airline Deregulation Act was Congress’ test of the viability of transforming the airline industry, an industry that had, until that time, been considered in the nature of a regulated utility, into a model of the benefits of economic competition.  Specifically, the ADA eliminated Federal control over airline routes and pricing, and prohibited any local or state government from exercising that control.  Its intended purpose was to increase competition thus expanding service and lowering prices to the public.

The fundamental problem with this conversion from utility to free market is that is ignores the fundamental reality that airlines like other transportation industry components have never been able to survive for long without government subsidies.  They are continuously subsidized out of the taxpayers’ pockets in at least two ways:  (1) construction and improvement of airports upon which airlines operate are paid for 80-90% by grants from the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), to which development airlines contribute through landing fees and other charges; and (2) in times of economic upheaval such as the aftermath of 9/11, they received direct gifts from the government to keep them afloat.  Until September/October, 2008, when banks began getting Federal government handouts, airlines were among the principal U.S. businesses relying upon such taxpayer largesse.

A debate has now arisen within the airline industry cncerning the wisdom of some form of re-regulatoin.  On the one hand, Robert Crandall, former President of American Airlines, argues, in his article of June 16, 2008, in Aviation Week and Space Technology, that "unfettered competition does not work.  Airlines are more like utilities," and that "a fundamental problem is how the industry prices its product.  The instant perishability of empty seats and the impossibility of quickly reducing fixed costs when demand falters, create a temptation to sell seats too cheaply."  He suggest, among other things, some combination of "modest price regulation," and "capacity controls at congested airports, revised bankruptcy and labor laws, and a more accommodating stance toward industry collaboration."  Id., see also, Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 27, 2008.

On the other hand, those who disagree contend that deregulation should be extended to "completing the move to deregulation in areas as foreign investment [in U.S. airlines] laws, security mandates, bankruptcy reform, and operational restrictions."  Id.

Whichever way it goes in the future, the traveler is being squeezed now.  Aircraft operations are being cut back, services are being eliminated, delays are increasing, baggage incurs additional charges, and, adding insult to injury, travelers are paying "fuel surcharges."  Ironically, however, deregulation has also allowed airlines to consolidate, thus freezing out startups, and raising prices to the public, the opposite of the effect deregulation was supposed to have had.  No one argues that airlines are not an indispensable part of the nation’s transportation system.  It is, therefore, clear tha they will have to continue to survice and, hopefully, to thrive.  However, the question raised by Bob Crandall, i.e., whether a heavily subsidized airline industry can survive in the guise of free market enterprises, still hangs in the air.

Related Articles:

On October 28, 2008, Acting FAA Administrator Bobby Sturgell rolled out the FAA’s 2009-20013 "Flight Plan" at a speech in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.  The "Flight Plan," in which FAA sets goals for itself, is "the strategic plan for the agency, the plan to help [the agency] prepare for the future."  In the past year, for example, as Acting Administrator Sturgell pointed out, the FAA "reached 25 out of 29 goals," with the remaining goals "probably" being achieved by November 20, 2008.  In other words, the goals set in the Flight Plan are projects and issues that the FAA has good reason to believe it can achieve over the stated planning horizon.

Priority one, according to the Flight Plan, is "dealing with congestion and delays . . . both in the air and on the ground.  Toward that end, the FAA plans to "identify and address capacity-constrained airports and metropolitan areas."  The FAA has identified Atlanta, Chicago Midway, Fort Lauderdale, John Wayne Orange County (CA), Las Vegas, Long Beach, Oakland, Phoenix, San Diego and San Francisco as being "capacity constrained" and provided these airports with a "toolbox" which includes "technological, procedural, and infrastructure improvements to be considered for implementation at airports based on additional capacity needs in the future."

In addition, in FY 2009, the FAA plans to "increase aviation capacity and reduce congestion in the 7 metro areas and corridors that most affect total system delay."  Those areas are:  San Francisco, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Chicago, Charlotte, New York and Philadelphia.  Apart from continuing the controversial airspace redesign for the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Metropolitan area, and the slot auctions for JFK, Newark and LaGuardia, which all spawned lawsuits, the FAA plans on moving forward with the redesign of the airspace for the remaining 7 metro areas.

 

Continue Reading FAA’s 2009-2013 Flight Plan Includes 5 More Airports Due for an Airspace Redesign

The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) designated the California Air Resources Board (CARB) as the lead agency for  its implementation.  The next milestone for CARB is developing a Scoping Plan outlining California’s strategy to achieve the 2020 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limit.  So on October 15, 2008, CARB published its Climate Change Proposed Scoping Plan:  A Framework for Change.  The Scoping Plan contains the main strategies California will use to reduce the greenhouse gases that cause climate change. Since this plan has the potential to affect just about every sector of California, CARB is seeking the public’s comments.  Comments on the Scoping Plan are due no later than December 10, 2008.  The Scoping Plan will be presented for approval at the CARB’s December 11, 2008, meeting

The Scoping Plan proposes a comprehensive set of actions designed to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions in California.  Among the solutions it proposes are "improving our state’s infrastructure, transitioning to cleaner and more secure sources of energy, and adopting 21st century land use planning and development practices."  Moreover, CARB lists as the key elements of its recommendations:

  • Establishing targets for transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions for regions throughout California, and pursuing policies and incentives to achieve those targets;
  • Developing a California cap-and-trade program that links with other Western Climate Initiative partner programs to create a regional market system; including California’s clean car standards, goods and movement measures, and the Low Carbon Fuel Standard;
  • Adopting and implementing measures pursuant to existing State laws and policies,
  • Expanding and strengthening existing energy efficiency programs as well as building and appliance standards;
  • Achieving a statewide renewables energy mix of 33 percent; and
  • Creating targeted fees, including a public goods charge on water use, fees on high global warming potential gases, and a fee to fund the administrative costs of the State’s long term commitment to AB 32 implementation.

Noticeably absent from the Scoping Plan is any mention of airports or aircraft.  This is due to the CARB’s perceived inability  to do much about airports and aircraft due to FAA’s pre-empting the field.  Indeed, about the only mention of airports and aircraft in the AB 32 materials comes in Appendix C of the Draft Scoping Plan:

Emissions from the fuel used in planes is an important consideration, however, the State does not have regulatory authority over aviation. ARB has not identified aviation specific measures; however, successful deployment of High Speed Rail could divert some air passengers to rail.

Draft Proposed Scoping Plan, Appendix C, p. C-21.  Nor does the Scoping Plan take the emissions of aircraft have while they are in air.

As a final note, there will be a public hearing on the Scoping Plan on November 20, 2008, in Sacramento, to consider the AB 32 Scoping Plan to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions in California.  Click here for the Agenda.

 

As part of the California Air Resources Board’s (CARB) "Climate Change Proposed Scoping Plan," the Board, on October 24, 2008, released its Preliminary Draft Staff Proposal on recommended approaches for setting Interim significance thresholds for greenhouse gases under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).  Since these thresholds of significance will affect the conduct of EIRs for projects subject to CEQA, such as airport development projects and Airport Land Use Compatibility Plans, participation in the setting of these standards is critical.

California law provides that climate change is an environmental effect subject to the CEQA.  Lead agencies, such as Airport Land Use Commissions, are therefore obligated to determine whether a project’s climate change-related effects may be significant, thereby requiring preparation of an Environmental Impact Report and to impose feasible mitigation to substantially lessen any significant effects.

CARB is specifically requesting participation from the public stakeholders and local lead agencies.  The Preliminary Draft Staff Proposal suggests a "sector approach" due to the fact that "(1) some sectors contribute more substantially to the problem, and therefore should have a greater obligation for emissions reductions, and (2) looking forward, there are differing levels of emissions reductions expected from different sectors in or to meet California’s climate objectives."

The PDSP includes flowcharts that address CARB’s "threshold concepts" for industrial projects and for residential and commercial projects.  The PDSP also states that that the staff is working on a proposal for an interim approach for thresholds for transportation projects.  CARB proposes, for example, a significance threshold of 7,000 metric tons of CO2e/year.  For Projects that go over that amount, an EIR would have to be prepared and "all feasible GHG mitigation measures implemented."

CARB has identified a few questions to solicit public comment, but notes that the "list is not exhaustive."

  • Will the recommended approaches have any unintended consequences, for example, encouraging the piecemealing of projects?
  • As set out in the attachments to the Staff Proposal, staff proposes to define certain performance standards (e.g., for energy efficiency) by referencing or compiling lists from existing local, State or national standards.  For some sub-sources of GHG emissions (e.g., construction, transportation, waste), ARB staff has not identified reference standards.  How should the performance standards for these sub-sources be defined?
  • Are any of the industrial, residential, or commercial project types eligible for categorical exemptions likely to contribute more significantly to climate change than staff’s preliminary analysis indicates?
  • For residential and commercial projects, staff has proposed that the GHG emissions of some projects that meet GHG performance standards might under some circumstances still be considered cumulatively considerable and therefore significant.  What types of projects might still have climate change-related impacts?

As noted above, since these thresholds of significance will affect the conduct of EIRs for projects subject to CEQA, such as airport development projects and Airport Land Use Compatibility Plans, participation in the setting of these standards is critical.

 

Analysis of Legal Issues Regarding Slot Auctions, Part Two.

Having established previously that the FAA does not have specific authority to lease or otherwise dispose of slots, FAA turns to its general power to dispose of property in order to justify its auctioning of the slots.  Under 49 U.S.C. 106 FAA is authorized to:

acquire, construct, improve, repair, operate, and maintain . . . real and personal property . . . and to lease to others such real and personal property . . .” as well as to enter into “such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary to carry out the functions of FAA.

49 U.S.C. 106(l).  In addition 49 U.S.C. 40110 authorizes FAA “[to] dispose of an interest in property for adequate compensation . . .”  Thus, the FAA theorizes, if a slot is “property,” then by virtue of these three provisions it has all the authority it needs to dispose of the “property.”  

Leaving aside the statutory construction arguments that the FAA’s property disposition authority does not extend to such evanescent and intangible property rights as “slots,” the real legal question comes down to this:  Are slots a property right owned by the FAA?  

The controversy turns an interpretation of Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), which was mentioned in the GAO Legal Opinion, IATA’s comments and ATA’s comments.  Cleveland stands for the proposition that the government’s regulatory powers to issue licenses to do something which otherwise would not be permitted does not create a property right for the government.  It only becomes a property right to the licensee after the issuance of the license.  In Cleveland, Louisiana claimed that licenses it issued to run video poker devices were its “property.”  The U.S. Supreme Court saw it a little differently:

Without doubt, Louisiana has a substantial economic stake in the video poker industry.  The State collects an upfront “processing fee” for each new license application . . ., a separate “processing fee” for each renewal application . . ., an “annual fee” from each device owner . . ., an additional “device operation” fee . . ., and, most importantly, a fixed percentage of net revenue from each video poker device . . . It is hardly evident, however, why these tolls should make video poker licenses “property” in the hands of the State.  The State receives the lion share of its expected revenue not while the licenses remain in its own hands, but only after they have been issued to licensees.  Licenses pre-issuance do not generate an ongoing stream of revenue.  At most, they entitle the State to collect a processing fee from applicants for new licenses.  Were an entitlement of this order sufficient to establish a state property right, one could scarcely avoid the conclusion that States have property rights in any license or permit requiring an up front fee, including drivers’ licenses, medical licenses, and fishing and hunting licenses.  Such licenses, as the Government itself concedes, are “purely regulatory.”

531 U.S. at 22. In other words, absent a statutory provision, so long as the “property” (the license in Cleveland) is the product of the Government’s regulatory power, or its police powers, it is not property while it is in the Government’s hands.  In this case, it would seem, based on Cleveland, that since the FAA derives its authority to assign slots from its regulatory authority over “navigable airspace,” slots are not property rights in the hands of the FAA.

FAA attempts to get around Cleveland by asserting that “Section 40110(a)(2) does not speak to whether the FAA actually owns property that is being disposed of.  It only speaks to the disposal of a property interest.  Only the FAA has authority to assign the use of navigable airspace under section 40103.”  73 Fed.Reg. at 60549.  The FAA concludes that even though the property right is created “at the time of transference” of the slot, it still falls within its property disposition power under 40110(a)(2) since it is “disposing of” a “property right.”  This however, ignores the fact that the FAA has no property interest to “dispose of,” and that in assigning slots it carrying out its regulatory duties with respect to the airspace.

Similar to the FAA, in Cleveland, Louisiana tried to compare its interest in video poker licenses to a patent holder’s interest in a patent that she has not yet licensed.  The court rejected that argument:

Louisiana does not conduct gaming operations itself, it does not hold video poker licenses to reserve that prerogative, and it does not “sell” video poker licenses in the ordinary commercial sense.  Furthermore, while a patent holder may sell her patent . . ., the State may not sell its licensing authority.  Instead of patent holder’s interest in an unlicensed patent, the better analogy is to the Federal Government’s interest in an unissued patent.  That interest, like the State’s interest in licensing video poker operations, surely implicates the Government’s role as sovereign, not as property holder.

531 U.S. at 23-24.  In other words, if it is not a property right until after it is sold or licensed, you do not have a “property right” to “dispose of.”  The FAA’s assigning use of navigable airspace “implicates the Government’s role as sovereign, not as property holder.”  Thus, it seems that since the Supreme Court has spoken on this issue, the FAA will be hard pressed to successfully argue that it can auction slots by virtue of its property disposition authority.

Next Post: Even if slots are FAA property, does the FAA violate the IOAA by accepting money for them?

 

Pt. 1: Setting The Stage

When the FAA adopted its slot auction rules for LaGuardia, JFK  and Newark Airports, it did so despite the fact that the GAO had issued a legal opinion stating that it believed that the FAA did not have a legal basis to conduct auctions of slots at the airports. 

Needless to say, the FAA’s decision brought some criticism from Congress.  Rep. James Oberstar (D-Minn.) and Rep. Patty Murray (D-Wash.) sent a letter to the FAA Inspector General, Hon. Calvin Scovel, requesting that he look into the matter and assess whether the FAA’s actions were "potential willful violations of the Purpose Statute [31 U.S.C. 1301(a)] and the Antideficiency Act [31 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1)(A)]." 

The stakes got higher when, on October 10, 2008, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey filed a Petition for Review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  That Petition was followed on October 14, 2008, by similar Petitions for Review filed by the International Air Transport Association and the Air Transport Association of America.  All of the Petitions for Review were consolidated by the Court on October 27, 2008.

There seems to be agreement among all of the parties that the FAA has the regulatory authority to impose caps on hourly arrival and departure slots based on its authority under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(1) and (2), which allows the FAA to "ensure efficient use of the airspace."  The issue that separates the FAA from GAO, IATA, ATA and PANYNJ is whether the FAA may raise funds in connection with its assignment of slots through a slot auction, imposing a user fee, assessing a tax, or by some other mechanism.

In analyzing this fundamental disagreement some consensus emerges.  It is agreed that Congress has granted FAA explicit statutory authority to collect fees in several different situations, but that FAA has no explicit authority to impose fees related to the assignment of slots.  Indeed, the FAA has long sought such explicit authorization from Congress, which Congress has not yet granted.  See, e.g., 71 Fed.Reg. 51362 (Aug. 29, 2006) ( ". . . the FAA currently does not have the statutory authority to assess market-clearing charges for a landing or departure authorization").  It is FAA’s efforts to get around the fact that it lacks explicit authority that is at the heart of the matter.

In order to claim authority to collect funds in connection with its assignment of slots, FAA makes two connected arguments.  First, FAA claims that a "slot" is an "intangible" form of property that it may lease pursuant to its "property disposition" power granted to it by Congress under 49 U.S.C. 106(l)(6) and (n) and 40110(a)(2).  Second, since the slot is a property right being leased, it is not an "user fee" or "tax."  Therefore, it is not subject to the Independent Offices Appropriations Act (IOAA), 31 U.S.C. 9701 et seq.  The opposing parties have claimed that the FAA is wrong on both counts.

Next Post:  Analysis of FAA’s claims that it possesses a property interest in slots at airports.

 

On September 26, 2008, the FAA published a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the construction and operation of proposed airfield improvements to Palm Beach International Airport (PBIA) “to accommodate existing and projected aviation demand.”  Comments on the DEIS are due no later than November 24, 2008.  Since the Airport Sponsor (Palm Beach County) seeks to enhance capacity at PBIA, one would think that there would be a concomitant increase in environmental effects of the project over what would be considered the "no action" alternative, i.e.,  not doing the project.  However, the FAA claims that there will be a net decrease in environmental effects (after construction) because the project will not increase capacity above what is already planned and delays will be reduced.  See below for an analysis of that issue. That being said, the FAA admits to there being a shift in the noise contours and an increase in air pollution created by the airport, at least temporarily by the construction created by the Project.

The major "airfield improvements" that the FAA is requesting approval for are:

  • Modifications to Runway 9R/27L.  Relocate and construct Runway 9R/27L 100 feet south of its existing location to  length of 8,000 feet and a width of 150 feet.
  • Modifications to Runway 13/31.  Shorten the southeast end of Runway 13/31 currently 6,932 in length) by 3,412 to provide a standard Runway Safety Area and extend the northwest end of Runway 13/31 by 480 feet.  The total adjusted length of Runway 13/31 would be 4,000 feet.

According to the DEIS, "once constructed and operational, the improved Runway 9R/27L would be primarily used as an arrival runway, and existing Runway 9L/27R would be used as the primary departure runway.  Because of its shortened length . . . Runway 13/31 would be used only by small, G[eneral] A[viation]-type aircraft."

The FAA admits that Proposed Project will result in significant increases in noise.  In 2013, the Proposed Project would cause 386 housing units and 957 people to experience a DNL 1.5 increase or greater.  By 2018 the number of affected housing units will increase by 423 and another 1,049 people.  Both of these increases are considered to be "significant impacts" under FAA criteria.  For these people, the FAA is deciding whether to offer:

  • Acquisition and relocation of homes;
  • Purchase of an avigation easement;
  • Sound insulation in exchange for an avigation easement; or
  • Purchase assistance.

Moreover, there will be impacts on property that do not experience an increase of DNL 1.5.  FAA criteria does not consider these impacts to be significant, therefore no mitigation will be proposed for the Project.  The FAA states that the "Airport Sponsor [Palm Beach County] may initiate an update to their current FAR Part 150 Noise Compatibility Program to mitigate noise impacts to these additional homes."

The FAA relies heavily on the assumption that the Proposed Project will not increase capacity beyond what is already forecast.  Thus, it claims environmental benefits based on the reduction of time that aircraft spend idling and taxiing due to a decrease in delays created by the Proposed Project.  This assumption, however, ignores the economic principle "induced demand," that is, if delay times are decreased during peak hours, then the airlines will, most likely, schedule additional flights thereby increasing the number of aircraft on the runways, which will increase idling and taxi time.  This is not a concept that is foreign to the FAA, since it includes in its Benefit Cost Analysis Guidance for Airport Sponsor a specific formula that equates a decrease in delay time with an increase in aircraft operations.  See, p.41 and Appendix C of FAA Benefit Cost Analysis Guidance.

With respect to air quality, although the FAA admits to a short-term rise in emissions due to construction of the Proposed Project, the FAA claims that the Proposed Project will result in fewer emissions than if the Project is not constructed.  This outcome is based on the FAA’s assumption that increasing the capacity of the airport will not cause the airlines to schedule additional flights over and above those already forecast.  Thus, the decrease in emissions "is due to the reduced aircraft taxiing times associated with the planned improvements to the airports."  Thus, if the airlines schedule flights over and above those already forecast, this benefit is eliminated or, at least, seriously diminished.  This would be an increase not only of "criteria pollutants" (i.e., Volatile Organic Compounds, Nitrous Oxides, and Particulate Matter) but also of "Hazardous Air Pollutants" and greenhouse gases. 

Moreover, despite recent studies indicating that emission of pollutants above 3,500 feet above ground level has an effect on air pollutant levels on the ground (click here for a summary of the Taubman and the Clark studies, click here (on p.3) for a summary of the University of Maryland study), the FAA ignores the effect that such high level emissions will have.

In addition, although the FAA did "inventory" Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs) at PBI, it did not perform a Human Health Assessment.  The FAA claims that because the EPA has not set a "National Ambient Air Quality Standard" (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act, it need not assess the impact that the Proposed Project will have on the emission of HAPs.  However, this ignores the NEPA requirement that all environmental effects of a federal project must be assessed.  NEPA does not limit the air quality assessment solely to "criteria pollutants."  Thus, a Human Health Assessment of the HAPs would be appropriate in this case.

A couple of final notes:

  • Comments on the DEIS are due no later than November 24, 2008. 
  • That being said, it should also be noted that if one were to bring a lawsuit against the FAA after the FAA decides to implement this Project, that person is limited to raising issues before the court that he or she raised before the FAA.  In other words, if no one comments on the Project on a particular issue prior to the FAA making its final decision, that issue may not be raised in a subsequent lawsuit.

Continue Reading FAA Publishes a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Palm Beach International Airport’s Airfield Enhancement Project

The FAA recently published the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for its "Capacity Enhancement Project" (CEP) (warning! this is a large file, the DEIS is broken up into Chapters at the end of this post) at the Philadelphia International Airport (PHL).  Comments on the DEIS are due no later than November 10, 2008.  Since, as its title suggests, the FAA seeks to increase capacity at PHL, there is a concomitant increase in environmental effects of the project over what would be considered the "no action" alternative,i.e., not doing the project.  In particular, there will be increases in noise in certain areas and an increase in air pollution created by the airport, not only by the increase in aircraft once the project is finished, but also by the construction created by the Project.

After dismissing several options as not meeting the "Purpose and Need" of the Project, the FAA offers two alternatives, both involve:

  • the addition of a new 12,000-foot runway 9C-27C;
  • relocating the Air Traffic Control, Tinicum Island Road, Island Avenue, and the UPS terminal;
  • closing Hog Island Pier and and extending Fort Mifflin Pier; and,
  • closing Conrail line south of the Airport and constructing new rail line northeast of the Airport. 

The major differences between the two alternatives are:

  • Alternative B eliminates the 6,500-foot runway, Runway 17-35; and
  • Alternative B would tear down the existing terminal and create a terminal system similar to that at Atlanta Hartfield with terminal "islands" connected by a People Mover;

Although the FAA claims that the total population and housing units exposed to DNL 65 dB and greater would decrease substantially under both alternatives, those decreases "would occur primarily north of the Airport in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania as a result of eliminating Runway 17-35 or significantly reducing its use."  That being said, the FAA admits that there would be "significant impacts" under both alternatives to people and housing units in Delaware County thus shifting the noise contours from Philadelphia County to Delaware County.  In addition, both Camden and Gloucester Counties would experience increases in noise levels during the twelve years of construction.

Likewise, with respect to air quality, the FAA admits that there will be an increase in emissions of pollutants, especially during the construction phase of the project.  This is an increase not only of "criteria pollutants" (i.e., Volatile Organic Compounds, Nitrous Oxides, and Particulate Matter) but also of "Hazardous Air Pollutants" and greenhouse gases.  Moreover, despite recent studies indicating that emission of pollutants above 3,500 feet above ground level has an effect on air pollutant levels on the ground (click here for a summary of the Taubman and the Clark studies, click here (on p.3) for a summary of the University of Maryland study), the FAA ignores the effect that such high level emissions will have.  

Humans will not be the only ones effected by the project.  The DEIS also reports that natural resources such as wetlands, and parks, as well as endangered and threatened species will be impacted by the Project.

A couple of final notes:

  • The DEIS does not mention coordination with any local agency outside the City of Philadelphia. This is despite the fact that although the City of Philadelphia operates PHL, most of the Airport is actually located in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.
  • Comments on the DEIS are due no later than November 10, 2008.  That being said, it should also be noted that if one were to bring a lawsuit against the FAA after the FAA decides to implement this Project, that person is limited to raising issues before the court that he or she raised before the FAA.  In other words, if no one comments on the Project on a particular issue prior to the FAA making its final decision, that issue may not be raised in a subsequent lawsuit.

More information regarding the Project can be found at the Project web site http://www.phl-cep-eis.com.  Here are links to the separate Chapters, Figures and Appendices, if you do not want to download the entire DEIS.

 

In a gutsy move that is sure to draw the ire of Congressional leaders as well as the Air Transport Association, the FAA announced last Friday, October 10, 2008, that it had promulgated two "congestion management" rules:  one for LaGuardia Airport, and the other for JFK and Newark Airports.  In these rules, the FAA stated that it would proceed with its auctions of slots at the airports despite the GAO Report indicating that it was unlawful to do so. (See, GAO Declares FAA Does Not Have Legal Authority to Auction Slots).

The Rule for JFK and Newark and the Rule for Newark, which both become effective December 9, 2008, establish procedures to address "congestion in the New York City area by assigning slots" at the three airports in a way that the FAA believes will allow "carriers to respond to market forces to drive efficient airline behavior."  The JFK/EWR Rule extends the caps on the operation at the two airports, assigns to existing operators the majority of slots at the airports, while the LGA Rule grandfathers the majority of operations at the airport.  The FAA claims that both Rules will develop a "robust" secondary market by annually auctioning off a limited number of slots in each of the first five years of this rule.  The FAA states that the proceeds of the auction will be used to mitigate congestion and delay in the New York City area.  Finally, the Rule also contains provisions for minimum usage, capping unscheduled operations, and withdrawal for operational need.  Leases obtained in the first auction will start on October 25, 2009.

Most of the Federal Register notice announcing the promulgation of the Rules is spent justifying the Rules in the face of the GAO’s report that concluded that the FAA did not have the authority to auction the slots.  The FAA concludes that "the issues involved represent novel legal issues upon which reasonable poeple, and agencies, acting in good faith, have disagreed.  The FAA disagrees with the GAO conclusions and has decided to proceed with the adoption of this final rule."

An analysis of the legal statements will be forthcoming in future blogs.