Aviation Lawyer & Attorney : Chevalier Allen & Lichman Law Firm : Airport Development, Environmental Law

The GAO, in a legal opinion issued September 30, 2008, declared that "FAA currently lacks the authority to auction arrival and departure slots, and thus also lacks authority to retain and use auction proceeds."  This legal opinion came as a result of a Congressional request.

In April and May, 2008, the FAA issued proposed regulations to conduct auctions of the airport arrival and departure slots at LaGuardia, JFK and Newark airports. (See, FAA Proposes Congestion Management Rule for JFK and Newark Liberty).  Since then, the FAA indicated in August that that it was proceeding with an auction of two specific slots at Newark airport on September 3, 2008.  Although that action was administratively stayed (See, FAA Suspends Auction of Flight Slot at Newark Airport), the stay (issued by the FAA's Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition) was subsequently lifted on September 30, 2008.  Moreover, the FAA, on September 16, 2008, announced that it "may" auction slots at Newark, LaGuardia and JFK starting on January 12, 2009.

The FAA claimed that the slots are "intangible property" that it "constructs, owns, and may lease" for "adequate compensation under 49 U.S.C. 106(l)(6) and (n) and 40110(a)(2).  The GAO stated:

An examination of those statutes read as a whole, however, makes clear that Congress was using the term "property" to refer to traditional forms of property.  It was not referring to FAA's regulatory authority to assign airspace slots, no matter how valuable those slots may be in the hands of the regulated community.  Related case law confirms our conclusion.

The GAO concluded that if the auctions were to go ahead, and the FAA retained the proceeds that the the GAO "would raise exceptions under its account settlement authority for violations of the 'purpose statute,' 31 U.S.C. 1301(a), and the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1)(A)."

Needless to say the Department of Transportation was not too pleased with the outcome, stating that the GAO did not have time to do a thorough review given the "complexities of aviation law."  If the GAO had the opportunity to reflect, the DOT was "confident that GAO will better understand both the validity and the effectiveness of [the FAA's] approach."

On the other side of the fence, both the Air Transport Association and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey issued press releases applauded the GAO's legal opinion.  Rep. James Oberstar (D-Minn.), the Chairman of the U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, said in a press release that the "FAA should now reconsider its plan to auction slots in light of the GAO finding."

(For my commentary on the situation, see the blog post The "Tragedy of the Commons" and Airport Congestion Management)

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued its long awaited "FAA Airspace Redesign:  An Analysis of the New York/New Jersey/Pennsylvania Project."  Although the GAO promised to publish the report by August 1, 2008, it waited until the same day the Petitioners in the Airspace Redesign litigation filed their opening brief to publish the Report.  Although the GAO promised members of Congress to examine "to what extent did FAA follow key legal procedures and requirements in conducting its environmental review" (p.3), it failed to take into two important aspects of the FAA's environmental review of its Airspace Redesign project, namely the Clean Air Act and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act (for a full treatment of these issues, see the Joint Brief filed by the 12 sets of Petitioners in the Airspace Redesign litigation).

The GAO, making several critical assumptions about the Project, found, in general, that the FAA's approach, at least with respect to NEPA, was "reasonable."  First, the GAO found that the statement of the project's purpose and need, which, according to the GAO, was to increase the efficiency and reliability of the airspace while maintaining safety and reducing delays, was reasonable.  Most importantly, the GAO concluded that the FAA "reasonably excluded noise reduction."  Second, the GAO found that the FAA developed a reasonable range of alternatives.  Third, the FAA acted reasonably in not analyzing the indirect environmental effects of potential growth, the GAO said, resulting from the redesign.  Next, the GAO opined that the FAA reasonably involved the public throughout the environmental review process.  Finally, the GAO found that the FAA satisfied environmental justice directives in Executive Order 12898 and implementing CEQ guidance and DOT Order.

The GAO did identify some limitations to the FAA's methodology, but concluded that the FAA was not required by law to address them.  These "limitations" included the fact that because the FAA assumed that traffic demand and flight operations would not increase in response to airspace system improvements, the FAA did not account for the potential effect of the system improvements in its operational analysis.  Second, the FAA did not fully assess the uncertainty associated with each alternative estimated impacts.  And when the purported benefit of the Project is only a 0.8% reduction in fuel burnt, that "limitation" becomes more important.  Finally, the GAO believed that the FAA should have undertaken an analysis of the economic impacts using both an uncertainty analysis and a benefit-cost analysis.

What the GAO Report did not take into account are two important statutory requirements that are outside of NEPA's procedural requirements.  First, the GAO failed to take into account the fact that the FAA did not perform a "conformity applicability analysis" as required by the Clean Air Act, EPA regulations, and FAA orders.  The air quality in the areas around Philadelphia and New York are subject will be affected by the Airspace Redesign and there is no analysis anywhere in the FAA's environmental review regarding air quality.  Second, the GAO did not report on the FAA's failure to properly take section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act into account.  Section 4(f) protects federal, state and local natural areas from the environmental effects of Federal transportation projects.  The GAO Report did not mention the FAA's failure to properly identify and account for the environmental effects of the Project on those natural areas.

In the end, then, the GAO failed to answer the first question posed by Congress:  "to what extent did FAA follow key legal procedures and requirements in conducting its environmental review?"  Without a discussion of the Clean Air Act and 4(f), the Report is incomplete.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

The FAA first proposed limiting scheduled operations at Newark Liberty in a proposed order that was published in March 18, 2008, Federal Register.  The FAA has now, on May 21, 2008, issued its Order limiting scheduled operations at Newark Liberty Airport.  In the Order states:

• Takes effect at 6:00a.m. on June 20, 2008;
  
• Total air carrier operations will not exceed 81 per hour between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m.;
  
• The order sunsets on October 24, 2009;
  
• Air carriers have been assigned "Operating Authorizations," for specific time slots and operations (i.e., departure or arrival);
  
• In order to maintain the Operating Authorizations, the air carrier must use them at least 80% of the time;
  
• The Operating Authorizations can be sold and traded, so long as the air carrier has maintained the 80% usage prior to selling or trading. 
  

The FAA hopes that this will alleviate congestion and delays at Newark Liberty.

Secretary of Transportation Mary Peters told FAA’s Aviation Forecast Conference in March, 2008, that she believed that the caps at Newark will actually result in an increase in operations at Newark Liberty. She stated that “overall, the caps at Newark allow 30 more operations per day than were offered last summer – just more reasonably spaced."  The question remains, however, whether caps will achieve the goals of reducing delays and congestion without an economic impact on the airlines and quality of life impact on the surrounding communties. 

Alfred Kahn, the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board under President Carter, in a recent working paper, stated his belief that congestion pricing would be a better approach.  He argues that the allocation of scarce airport resources is an economic problem and should be treated as such, therefore, air carriers should pay for the privilege of taking-off or landing at particular times.

With the summer travel season almost here, we will see what effect the caps at Newark and JFK will have on delays at the airport and noise in the community.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (1)

In the May 21, 2008, issue of the Federal Register, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposed a new rule affecting two airports that are a part of the East Coast Airspace Redesign.  The FAA proposes to establish procedures to address congestion in the New York City area by assigning slots at JFK and Newark Liberty Airports in a way that allows carriers to respond to market forces to drive efficient airline behavior.

• The FAA's proposed rule is similar in many respects to its proposal for LaGuardia airport. 
  
• This proposal, however, takes into account the fact that both JFK and Newark have a large number of international flights, which implicates FAA's international obligations. 
  
• The FAA proposes to
  
  • extend the caps on the operations at the two airports,
    
  • assign to existing operators the majority of slots at the airports, and
    
  • create a market by annually auctioning off a limited number of slots in each of the first five years of this rule.

The proposed rule offers two alternatives in the method of assigning slots at the airport. Under the first alternative:

• the assignment of slots at JFK and Newark would be conducted through a uniform mechanism.
  
• The FAA would auction off a portion of the slots and would use the proceeds to mitigate congestion and delay in the New York City area.
  

Under the second alternative, the same auction procedure would apply at Newark as under the first alternative but at JFK the auction proceeds would go to the carrier holding the slot rather than to the FAA.

For both alternatives, this proposal also contains:

• provisions for minimum usage,
  
• capping unscheduled operations, and
  
• withdrawal for operational need.
  

The FAA proposes to sunset the rule in ten years. For additional information and coverage about this topic see:

• Slot auctions coming to all 3 NYC-area airports
• Slots for sale: government plans to auction off landing rights in New York Steve Sujaputra's post on the blog Tripso
• DOT proposes slot auctions to reduce congestion at NYC airports

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (1)