Aviation Lawyer & Attorney : Chevalier Allen & Lichman Law Firm : Airport Development, Environmental Law

In a gutsy move that is sure to draw the ire of Congressional leaders as well as the Air Transport Association, the FAA announced last Friday, October 10, 2008, that it had promulgated two "congestion management" rules:  one for LaGuardia Airport, and the other for JFK and Newark Airports.  In these rules, the FAA stated that it would proceed with its auctions of slots at the airports despite the GAO Report indicating that it was unlawful to do so. (See, GAO Declares FAA Does Not Have Legal Authority to Auction Slots).

The Rule for JFK and Newark and the Rule for Newark, which both become effective December 9, 2008, establish procedures to address "congestion in the New York City area by assigning slots" at the three airports in a way that the FAA believes will allow "carriers to respond to market forces to drive efficient airline behavior."  The JFK/EWR Rule extends the caps on the operation at the two airports, assigns to existing operators the majority of slots at the airports, while the LGA Rule grandfathers the majority of operations at the airport.  The FAA claims that both Rules will develop a "robust" secondary market by annually auctioning off a limited number of slots in each of the first five years of this rule.  The FAA states that the proceeds of the auction will be used to mitigate congestion and delay in the New York City area.  Finally, the Rule also contains provisions for minimum usage, capping unscheduled operations, and withdrawal for operational need.  Leases obtained in the first auction will start on October 25, 2009.

Most of the Federal Register notice announcing the promulgation of the Rules is spent justifying the Rules in the face of the GAO's report that concluded that the FAA did not have the authority to auction the slots.  The FAA concludes that "the issues involved represent novel legal issues upon which reasonable poeple, and agencies, acting in good faith, have disagreed.  The FAA disagrees with the GAO conclusions and has decided to proceed with the adoption of this final rule."

An analysis of the legal statements will be forthcoming in future blogs.

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The GAO, in a legal opinion issued September 30, 2008, declared that "FAA currently lacks the authority to auction arrival and departure slots, and thus also lacks authority to retain and use auction proceeds."  This legal opinion came as a result of a Congressional request.

In April and May, 2008, the FAA issued proposed regulations to conduct auctions of the airport arrival and departure slots at LaGuardia, JFK and Newark airports. (See, FAA Proposes Congestion Management Rule for JFK and Newark Liberty).  Since then, the FAA indicated in August that that it was proceeding with an auction of two specific slots at Newark airport on September 3, 2008.  Although that action was administratively stayed (See, FAA Suspends Auction of Flight Slot at Newark Airport), the stay (issued by the FAA's Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition) was subsequently lifted on September 30, 2008.  Moreover, the FAA, on September 16, 2008, announced that it "may" auction slots at Newark, LaGuardia and JFK starting on January 12, 2009.

The FAA claimed that the slots are "intangible property" that it "constructs, owns, and may lease" for "adequate compensation under 49 U.S.C. 106(l)(6) and (n) and 40110(a)(2).  The GAO stated:

An examination of those statutes read as a whole, however, makes clear that Congress was using the term "property" to refer to traditional forms of property.  It was not referring to FAA's regulatory authority to assign airspace slots, no matter how valuable those slots may be in the hands of the regulated community.  Related case law confirms our conclusion.

The GAO concluded that if the auctions were to go ahead, and the FAA retained the proceeds that the the GAO "would raise exceptions under its account settlement authority for violations of the 'purpose statute,' 31 U.S.C. 1301(a), and the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1)(A)."

Needless to say the Department of Transportation was not too pleased with the outcome, stating that the GAO did not have time to do a thorough review given the "complexities of aviation law."  If the GAO had the opportunity to reflect, the DOT was "confident that GAO will better understand both the validity and the effectiveness of [the FAA's] approach."

On the other side of the fence, both the Air Transport Association and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey issued press releases applauded the GAO's legal opinion.  Rep. James Oberstar (D-Minn.), the Chairman of the U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, said in a press release that the "FAA should now reconsider its plan to auction slots in light of the GAO finding."

(For my commentary on the situation, see the blog post The "Tragedy of the Commons" and Airport Congestion Management)

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The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued its long awaited "FAA Airspace Redesign:  An Analysis of the New York/New Jersey/Pennsylvania Project."  Although the GAO promised to publish the report by August 1, 2008, it waited until the same day the Petitioners in the Airspace Redesign litigation filed their opening brief to publish the Report.  Although the GAO promised members of Congress to examine "to what extent did FAA follow key legal procedures and requirements in conducting its environmental review" (p.3), it failed to take into two important aspects of the FAA's environmental review of its Airspace Redesign project, namely the Clean Air Act and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act (for a full treatment of these issues, see the Joint Brief filed by the 12 sets of Petitioners in the Airspace Redesign litigation).

The GAO, making several critical assumptions about the Project, found, in general, that the FAA's approach, at least with respect to NEPA, was "reasonable."  First, the GAO found that the statement of the project's purpose and need, which, according to the GAO, was to increase the efficiency and reliability of the airspace while maintaining safety and reducing delays, was reasonable.  Most importantly, the GAO concluded that the FAA "reasonably excluded noise reduction."  Second, the GAO found that the FAA developed a reasonable range of alternatives.  Third, the FAA acted reasonably in not analyzing the indirect environmental effects of potential growth, the GAO said, resulting from the redesign.  Next, the GAO opined that the FAA reasonably involved the public throughout the environmental review process.  Finally, the GAO found that the FAA satisfied environmental justice directives in Executive Order 12898 and implementing CEQ guidance and DOT Order.

The GAO did identify some limitations to the FAA's methodology, but concluded that the FAA was not required by law to address them.  These "limitations" included the fact that because the FAA assumed that traffic demand and flight operations would not increase in response to airspace system improvements, the FAA did not account for the potential effect of the system improvements in its operational analysis.  Second, the FAA did not fully assess the uncertainty associated with each alternative estimated impacts.  And when the purported benefit of the Project is only a 0.8% reduction in fuel burnt, that "limitation" becomes more important.  Finally, the GAO believed that the FAA should have undertaken an analysis of the economic impacts using both an uncertainty analysis and a benefit-cost analysis.

What the GAO Report did not take into account are two important statutory requirements that are outside of NEPA's procedural requirements.  First, the GAO failed to take into account the fact that the FAA did not perform a "conformity applicability analysis" as required by the Clean Air Act, EPA regulations, and FAA orders.  The air quality in the areas around Philadelphia and New York are subject will be affected by the Airspace Redesign and there is no analysis anywhere in the FAA's environmental review regarding air quality.  Second, the GAO did not report on the FAA's failure to properly take section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act into account.  Section 4(f) protects federal, state and local natural areas from the environmental effects of Federal transportation projects.  The GAO Report did not mention the FAA's failure to properly identify and account for the environmental effects of the Project on those natural areas.

In the end, then, the GAO failed to answer the first question posed by Congress:  "to what extent did FAA follow key legal procedures and requirements in conducting its environmental review?"  Without a discussion of the Clean Air Act and 4(f), the Report is incomplete.

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