Legislature Asked to Grant CEQA Relief for Rail Projects

Following in the footsteps of his colleagues, on January 6, 2012, Assemblyman Mike Feuer introduced legislation that would give rail projects the same type of relief from California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) requirements that were received in the last session by the proposed NFL stadium in Los Angeles, and some renewable energy projects. Notably, the CEQA amendments enacted for the NFL stadium include a very short time frame of 175 days for resolution of CEQA issues. While current CEQA litigation may extend to two years or more, depending on the complexity of the project and workload of the court, it stands to reason that issues surrounding local projects such as the stadium, with local traffic, noise and air quality impacts, may potentially be resolved within the 175 day timeframe. Rail projects are of far different scope, geographic extent, and are subject to a different set of laws.

Indeed, the geographic size of rail projects implicates the greater scope of legal applicability. Rail projects, even if, like the current “high speed rail,” limited to within the borders of California, will, of necessity, be recipients of Federal funding. Consequently, Federal environmental statutes, including the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq., and the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7501, et seq., apply. Thus, while the California legislature may attenuate the CEQA process, the rail projects will still remain hostage to NEPA.

Finally, even if rail projects could proceed without Federal funding, which they most likely cannot, where they cross state lines, the Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is implicated, and Federal law will apply. In short, to attenuate the environmental review process for major transportation projects will require a different legislative template, at a different legislative forum, the United States Congress.
 

CEQA and the Law of Unintended Consequences

On September 27, 2011, Governor Jerry Brown signed into law Senate Bill 292 and Assembly Bill 900, both of which are aimed at expediting, or “fast-tracking,” the litigation of lawsuits brought under the California Environmental Quality Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (“CEQA”). SB292 is basically an earmark that will “fast-track” CEQA challenges to the Farmer’s Field National Football League Stadium proposed for downtown Los Angeles, next to the Los Angeles Convention Center and Staples Center, by requiring that such challenges be brought directly in California Courts of Appeals and be heard within 175 days. AB900 reaches more widely, “fast-tracking” all projects costing $100 million or more.

The stated intentions of the Bills’ sponsors are, on their faces, noble ones --- to provide more job opportunities, and spur increased spending and attendant tax revenue for the State, matters which seem urgent in light of the State of California’s economy. The problems raised by the Bills are less immediate, but no less important.
 

It’s fairly obvious that these two Bills drill large holes in CEQA’s blanket of protection of the public from the environmental impacts, both short and long term, of large scale development projects. It’s equally obvious that the Bills were intended to insulate not merely the stadium, but also other specific projects, such as the California High Speed Rail Project, from the usually lengthy CEQA process.

What is less obvious is that the Bills could also “fast-track” every airport improvement and/or expansion project in the State of California. This is because airport improvement projects are extremely costly, often involving reconfiguration of the airfield, including demolition and realignment of runways and taxiways, as well as terminal and parking lot construction. Even a small part of these potential activities could add up to hundreds of millions of dollars. So far so good you may be saying, because that type of major construction adds up to lots of jobs and better transportation.

This is where that nasty law of unintended consequences sneaks in. Along with the “good” of increased employment and capacity comes usually major, and always long term, environmental consequences on large swaths of numerous local communities. Such impacts include increased air pollution, greatly increased noise over the numerous residential communities located around airports, and the ubiquitous traffic impacts on local communities. Unlike the “fast-tracking” of the essentially local stadium project and of surface transportation projects which run in confined, proscribed corridors, airport impacts cover widespread and often unpredictable areas and populations.

It is true that access to the courts has merely been attenuated, not eliminated. But the impact of sending a challenge directly to the Courts of Appeals is draconian. The only path of reconsideration or appeal from a decision of a Court of Appeals is to the California Supreme Court. Because that court only accepts for hearing about 5% of the cases that apply to it, the new legislation effectively gives challengers only one bite at the apple. Thus, the Bills constitute a radical change in a state where Courts of Appeals regularly revised lower court decisions under CEQA.

Finally, and added to the already existing burdens on the Appellate Court system, the 175 day rule (or less than six months) to fully adjudicate a CEQA action further constrains the ability of the Appellate Courts, used to dealing with legal questions, to try what are usually highly fact specific and sometimes scientifically complex environmental issues.

In short, SB292 and AB900 are bad precedent, even if for good reasons. Special interest legislation is never desirable (although frighteningly common), and special interest legislation, the global consequences of which have not been fully considered, is even less desirable. It can only be hoped that environmental groups such as the National Resources Defense Council, which supported both Bills, will be just a quick to aide citizens affected by the legislation to adjust to their new legal reality.
 

California High-Speed Rail Project Could Be Derailed

Proponents of California’s proposed high-speed rail project envision a high-speed rail network connecting Sacramento, San Francisco, Central Valley, Los Angeles, Orange County, the Inland Empire and San Diego. However, there are many obstacles, real or imagined, that could delay or derail the project. First, the House Subcommittee on Transportation voted to fund only $1.4 billion for high-speed rail in FY 2011, compared to the $4 billion they approved last year. The project appears to be plagued by unreliable cost, ridership and revenue projections, uncertainty about private investment and, given the State of California’s finances, the possibility that taxpayers may have to subsidize the project if revenue projections are not met. A high-speed rail system would reduce revenues for Metrolink and Amtrak. A number of cities and communities along the proposed routes oppose the project. Finally, the proposed project will require environmental review. Environmental review will include at least two alternatives (in addition to the mandatory “no-action” alternative) – a “shared track” alternative and a “dedicated track” alternative. Both present problems.

 

The shared track alternative would require no major property purchases and save homes and businesses. However, it would result in fewer trains and lower speeds, as compared to the dedicated rail alternative. It would also likely cause delays of Metrolink and Amtrak trains. The dedicated track alternative would allow higher speeds and would not cause delays for Metrolink and Amtrak. However, it would be far more costly to purchase property or obtain easements and build new tracks and stations. Opponents claim that dedicated tracks would require destruction of homes and businesses, and have the potential to impact parks and historic properties. The dedicated track alternative will also meet with strong opposition by open space advocates. If selected, the dedicate track alternative would involve planning complexities for what could be one of the largest new public works projects in the U.S.

The High Speed Rail Right of Way Gets Crowded

As recently as early June, 2010, another competitor entered the field for the right to provide rail service from Las Vegas to Southern California: Genesis High Speed Rail America, LLC. The critical question is starting to emerge as to whether anticipated ridership can support not one, or two, but three entrants into the field.

There isn’t much to distinguish Genesis from its competitors, Desert Xpress, a conventional steel wheel high speed line, and the magnetic levitation variant sponsored by American Magline Group, except perhaps its route. That route will take a t-shape with a north/south leg from Las Vegas along the Colorado River to intersect with the I-10 freeway corridor, creating the east/west leg between Phoenix and Los Angeles.

Certainly, Genesis’ funding requirements are not more economical than those of its competitors. It estimates that a study of the optimal route would cost $35 million, with $35-40 billion in construction costs, much of which, it is hoped, will be obtained from Federal taxpayers. Planning for the Maglev project could cost as much as $60 million, although the custodian of most of the needed funds, the Federal Railroad Administration, has withheld a previously appropriated $45 million from the American Magline Group, on the grounds that American Magline has failed thus far to raise the required 20% match of private funds.

Finally, the conventional Desert Xpress seems to be the ultimate beneficiary of the dispute. With substantially lower planning and construction costs of $4 billion, it has won the support of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid on the ground that Desert Xpress is not seeking Federal funding. However, this seems to be a misapprehension corrected by Desert Xpress which admits that, due to the difficult economy, it will look to all available funding sources, including Federal funding.

What is absent from the debate is any clarification of the anticipated ridership of these rail lines. Amtrak’s existing lines on the East Coast have yet to make it into the black, despite the fact that two-thirds of those who ride the train on a regular basis live on the East Coast. The rail competitors are, apparently, betting not their own, but taxpayer dollars, that: (1) there is enough density of population in the target areas to make the project economically feasible; and (2) Californians and other westerners will abandon the comfort and privacy of their own automobiles for as yet unplanned, untested technology.