Aviation and Airport Development Law : Aviation Lawyer & Attorney : Dr. Barbara E. Lichman : Airport Development, Environmental Law

In Barnes, petitioners challenge the FAA’s environmental review of the proposed addition of a runway at Hillsboro Airport (“HIO”), a general aviation reliever airport for Portland International Airport (“PDX”), operated by the Port of Portland, and located in the adjacent City of Hillsboro, Oregon (“Project”). Specifically, petitioners challenged, among other things, the FAA’s decision to prepare only an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) and Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) not a full Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), which petitioners claim was necessary due to the potential environmental impacts of increased demand for HIO resulting from the addition of the runway.

First, expressing a view in contradiction with that a number of other Circuits, the court took issue with FAA’s consistent argument that “[T]he project will not have growth inducing effects on aviation activity.” Barnes, at 16285. The court pointed to the absence of any analysis in the EA of the new runway’s growth-inducing impacts. “The agencies are unable to point to anything in the record showing that they in fact considered the possibility that expanding HIO would lead to increased demand and increased airport operations,” Barnes, at 16281. The court, therefore, relied on FAA’s statement in the administrative record that “a new runway is ‘the most effective capacity enhancing feature an airfield can provide.’” Barnes, at 16281. In the absence of hard analysis establishing the lack of growth inducing impact, the court declined to take FAA’s “word for it and not question their conclusory assertion in the EA that a new runway would not increase demand.” Barnes, at 16285.

Second, the court declined to grant the “significant deference that courts give aviation activity forecasts actually performed by the FAA.” Barnes, at 16285-86. While the court agreed that “when it comes to airport runways, it is not necessarily true that ‘if you build it they will come,’” Barnes, at 16286, quoting National Parks and Conservation Association v. United States Department of Transportation, 222 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2000), it would not grant deference because FAA “failed to conduct a demand forecast based on three, rather than two, runways.” Barnes, at 16287.

The court, apparently realizing the groundbreaking nature of its decision, then proceeded to narrow the decision’s scope. It reconciled seemingly contradictory opinions in Seattle Community Federation v. FAA, 961 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1992) [“[R]emand to the FAA was unnecessary although the FAA did not consider the impacts of an expected increase in air traffic after changes in flight patterns were implemented,” Barnes, at 16288], and Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 580 (9th Cir. 1998), [“[T]he FAA did not have to consider the impacts of an increase in air traffic resulting from a new flight arrival path because ‘the project was implemented in order to deal with existing problems . . .’”, Barnes, at 16288]. The court rationalized that unlike the flight patterns and flight arrival path at issue in Morongo and Seattle Community Council Federation, “this case involves a major ground capacity expansion project.” Barnes, at 16288.

The court then went on to further narrow the definition of “major ground capacity expansion project” and, thus, its ruling, by excluding “terminal improvement project[s],” City of Los Angeles, supra, 138 F.3d at 808; taxiway construction, Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008); and “improvements to an existing runway,” City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

In summary, the Ninth Circuit has carved out a new, exclusive niche for projects that include construction of additional runways, because “our cases have consistently noted that a new runway has a unique potential to spur demand which sets it apart from other airport improvements like changing flight paths, improving a terminal or adding a taxiway . . .” Barnes, at 16288. Therefore, in the case of a runway addition, “[E]ven if the stated purpose of the project is to increase safety and efficiency, the agencies must analyze the impacts of the increased demand attributable to the additional runway as growth inducing effects . . .” Barnes, at 16289.

While we believe the court may have drawn a bright line demarcation between types of “major ground capacity expansion projects” where none exists in reality, Barnes constitutes a significant step toward recognition of the full complement of airport expansion impacts often ignored in FAA’s environmental analyses.
 

The draft guidance explains how Federal agencies should analyze the environmental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change when they describe the environmental impacts of a proposed action under NEPA.  It provides practical tools for agency reporting, including a presumptive threshold of 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions from the proposed action to trigger a quantitative analysis, and instructs agencies how to assess the effects of climate change on the proposed action and their design.  The draft guidance does not apply to land and resource management actions and does not propose to regulate greenhouse gases. 

While some courts have already held that climate change and greenhouse gas emissions must be considered in the NEPA process. See, “Greenhouse Gases Should Be Considered in All EISs and EAs;” see also, Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 508 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008), Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F.Supp.2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department of Energy, 260 F.Supp.2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003); and Mid-States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board, 345 F.3d 520 (8^th Cir. 2003). To these courts, these findings indicate that emission of greenhouse gases substantially contribute to climate change, and climate change is expected to result in widespread adverse environmental effects. Therefore, it should be mentioned in the EIS.

What the draft guidance does explain, however, that is not present in the case law are the “practical tools for agency reporting.” That is, it sets a de minimis level of 25,000 metric tons of CO2e before the proposed action would trigger quantitative analysis, which may eliminate many federal projects from the guidance.

The public comment period for this draft Guidance is 90 days. Comments may be submitted electronically from the CEQ’s website: http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/nepa/submit?topic=Consideration%20of%20Greenhouse%20Gases. In addition, at the end of the draft Guidance, the CEQ asks several questions that it would like to have addressed by the public:

1. How should NEPA documents regarding long-range energy and resource management programs assess GHG emissions and climate change impacts?

2. What should be included in specific NEPA guidance for projects applicable to the federal land management agencies?

3. What should be included in specific NEPA guidance for land management planning applicable to the federal land management agencies?

4. Should CEQ recommend any particular protocols for assessing land management practices and their effect on carbon release and sequestration?

5. How should uncertainties associated with climate change projections and species and ecosystem responses be addressed in protocols for assessing land management practices?

6. How should NEPA analyses be tailored to address the beneficial effects on GHG emissions of Federal land and resource management actions?

7. Should CEQ provide guidance to agencies on determining whether GHG emissions are “significant” for NEPA purposes. At what level should GHG emissions be considered to have significant cumulative effects. In this context, commenters may wish to consider the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007).

Draft Guidance on the Appropriateness of “Findings of No Significant Impact” Tightens Monitoring and Reporting Restrictions

When Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) is issued for a Federal action, the need for a detailed Environmental Impact Statement is obviated. Many Federal agencies attempt to mitigate the environmental impact of their actions as part of the NEPA process so that they can reach a FONSI and not be required to draft an EIS. However, in many cases, the follow-up on mitigation activities promised is lacking. Thus, the draft guidance seeks to clarify that although the environmental impacts of a proposed action may be mitigated to the point when the agency make a FONSI determination, the agency must make the mitigation requirements public and perform the necessary monitoring and reporting.

Revised Draft Guidance Clarifying Use of Categorical Exclusions

Many Federal actions do not have significant effects on the environment.  When these actions fall into broad categories of activities, agencies may apply a “categorical exclusion” from further NEPA review.  The CEQ originally released a draft guidance to clarify and promote the use of categorical exclusions on September 17, 2006. 71 Fed.Reg. 54816 (Sept. 17, 2006). This action would revise that draft guidance and clarify the rules for categorical exclusions and ensures that there is a concise public record when agencies apply them.  While CEQ previously has sought public comments on this matter, this guidance provides additional clarifications, so it will seek additional public comment for 45 days.