On January 17, 2017, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 5, the “Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017.” Buried deep within its pages is Title II, the “Separation of Powers Restoration Act.” That title, although only two sections long, dramatically changes the legal landscape for challenges to the actions of federal regulatory agencies. Currently, in adjudicating challenges to administrative rulemaking and implementing actions, the federal courts invoke the precedent established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). In that case, the Supreme Court held: “We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer...” In adopting Chevron, the Supreme Court effectively gives administrative agencies almost complete deference, not only in the interpretation of the regulations they implemented, but also, and more controversially, in the way the agencies carry out the mandates of those regulations. Thus, challengers seeking to use the judicial system to point out and rectify what are perceived as misapplication of the regulations, butt up against the reluctance of the courts to question or interfere with the agency’s construction of the regulation or the evidence and its application in carrying out the agency’s order. In Title II, the Congress has stood the current deferential standard on its head.Continue Reading...
Two More Southern California Cities and an Airport Join Culver City in its Challenge to the FAA's Southern California Airspace Redesign
In an unusual alliance, the Southern California cities of Newport Beach and Laguna Beach, as well as Orange County, owner and operator of John Wayne Airport (“JWA”), joined with Culver City to challenge the adequacy of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) Environmental Assessment (“EA”) and Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) for the Southern California Metroplex OAPM (“Project”). The Project is a redesign of the approaches and departures to and from more than a dozen Southern California airports. Its stated purpose is to enhance “safety and efficiency” by consolidating the various flight paths to and from these airports by using area navigation (“RNAV”), instead of ground based radar, which requires the use of “waypoints” that, in turn, require dispersion of the aircraft over large areas, and, consequently, the consumption of more fuel.
Culver City has issued a Press Release announcing its intention to file a lawsuit against the Federal Aviation Administration related to aircraft overflights. Culver City has retained Barbara E. Lichman, Ph.D. of the firm of Buchalter Nemer to represent it its challenge to the SoCal Metroplex Environmental Assessment ("EA") and Finding of No Significant Impact and Record of Decision ("FONSI/ROD").
Los Angeles City Council at Long Last Agrees to Transfer Ontario International Airport to the City of Ontario and Ontario International Airport Authority
In an anticipated, but no less surprising move, the City Council of the City of Los Angeles (“Los Angeles”) agreed to transfer Ontario International Airport (“ONT”), currently owned and operated by Los Angeles, to the Ontario International Airport Authority (“OIAA”) and its members which include the City of Ontario (“Ontario”). The transfer occurs in settlement of a currently pending lawsuit in the Riverside County Superior Court in which Ontario, the OIAA, and other parties challenged the legal right of Los Angeles to ownership and operation of ONT.
The decision of the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Idaho in SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner County, a case that has been “hanging fire” for almost two years, was worth the wait. On Friday, November 21, 2014, the Court granted Defendant Bonner County (“Bonner County”) summary judgment on all Plaintiff SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC’s (“SilverWing”) federal claims for inverse condemnation, or “taking,” of private property by a public entity without just compensation, in violation of the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights by a person acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In addition, the Court granted summary judgment on SilverWing’s state law contract claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
EPA Challenged to Issue Endangerment Finding and Rule Governing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Aircraft Engines
Two environmental organizations have again taken the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to task for failing in its mandatory duty to determine whether greenhouse gases from aircraft engines cause or contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare (“Endangerment Finding”), and, if so, to propose and adopt standards to limit those emissions. See Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A) (also referred to as “Section 231”).
Appellate Court Grants Wide Discretion to Newhall Land and Farming Project Proponents in the Determination of the Significance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under CEQA
The California Court of Appeal last week reversed a lower court decision that would have indefinitely delayed the development by Newhall Land and Farming Company of 21,308 residential units, 629 acres of mixed use development, 67 acres of commercial use, 249 acres of business park, and 1,014 acres of open space in northwestern Los Angeles County over the next 25-30 years (“Project”). The lower court’s decision had originally granted the Petition for Writ of Mandate brought by, among others, the Center for Biological Diversity (“Respondents”), challenging, among other actions by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (“DFW”) (“Appellant”), the revised Joint Federal/State Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Report (“EIS/EIR”) for the Project.
While the Appellate Court’s 112 page decision addressed numerous causes of action brought by Respondents in the trial court, one of the most unique and far reaching was its disposition of Respondents’ claim that the EIS/EIR’s baseline for assessing the cumulative impacts of the Project’s Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) emissions is a procedural issue properly evaluated under the “failure to proceed in a manner required by law” standard, applicable to procedural actions, and that, employing the correct standard, the EIS/EIR’s analysis was predicated on an illusory baseline. In a decision that is likely to be adopted in the adjudication of other California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) actions challenging the evolving state and federal GHG standards, the Appellate Court firmly disagreed.
High Court Goes a Second Round with Environmental Protection Agency Over Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations
On Monday, February 24, the United States Supreme Court watched the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), industry groups and sympathetic states take the ring over what the challengers call a “brazen power grab” by the Obama Administration and its environmental regulators, aimed at limited carbon emissions from new stationary sources such as power plants and factories.
This is not the first time the same parties have squared off over greenhouse gas (“GHG”) regulation. In 2008, the Obama Administration initiated rules governing mobile sources, requiring new motor vehicles to demonstrate better fuel efficiency and, thus, reduce carbon emissions. The High Court effectively upheld those rules by refusing to hear the challenges against them. The Administration this week announced plans to expand mobile source regulation by enacting new limits on carbon emissions for trucks and buses. EPA has hit a brick wall, however, with its expansion of regulation to stationary sources, concerning which the High Court will now be hearing oral argument on six different appeals. The upcoming legal battle, like so many others over environmental regulation, is fraught with political overtones, as well as a variety of legal issues.
D.C. Circuit Upholds FAA's "No Hazard" Determinations Regarding Electromagnetic Radiation from Nantucket Sound Wind Turbines
After protracted litigation challenging plans to build 130 wind turbines, each 440 feet tall, in a 25 square mile area of Nantucket Sound, the D.C. Circuit last month denied petitions for review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (“FAA”) determination that the turbines would pose no hazard to air navigation.
The petitioners, the Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts and a non-profit group of pilots and others, challenged the no hazard determinations based on the FAA’s failure to analyze the safety risks posed by the project and to perform an environmental review required by the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4332. The D.C. Circuit had previously vacated a 2010 no hazard determination based on the FAA’s failure to consider potential adverse effects of the turbines on pilots operating under visual flight rules (“VFR”) and the potential that electromagnetic radiation from the turbines would interfere with radar systems in nearby air navigation facilities.
Noting the circumstances had changed after the FAA upgraded the radar and beacon at Otis Airfield, the circuit court’s January 22, 2014 opinion upheld the FAA’s 2012 no hazard determinations. The court concluded that the FAA properly based its determinations on aeronautical studies conducted according to the FAA Handbook, Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters, FAA Order JO 7400.2J (February 9, 2012), of which Section 3 on identifying and evaluating aeronautical effect was applicable. According to the court, the FAA could reasonably view its Handbook procedures implementing the Secretary of Transportation’s regulations as requiring a threshold finding before triggering the need for a more advanced “adverse effects” analysis under Handbook Section 6–3–3 which states that “[a] structure is considered to have an adverse effect if it first ... is found to have physical or electromagnetic radiation effect on the operation of air navigation facilities.”
Predictably, Judge John Walter of the Los Angeles Federal District Court summarily dismissed a lawsuit brought by the City of Santa Monica (“Santa Monica”) aimed at closing the Santa Monica Airport, based on, among other things, unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. The court’s decision was made on the procedural grounds that, among other things, the lawsuit was brought too late and in the wrong court.
First, the court found that Santa Monica had brought the suit after the applicable 12 year statute of limitations had expired. 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a)(g). The court’s rationale was that Santa Monica knew as long ago as 1948 that the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) had a residual claim to the property arising from the Deed of Transfer of the federal government’s lease back to the City of Santa Monica. That residual claim, therefore, required that Santa Monica’s suit be brought no later than the early 1960s.
In addition, the court found that, even if a claim for unconstitutional taking could be sustained under the applicable statute of limitations, it was improperly brought in the District Court, as the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) vests exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over monetary claims against the federal government exceeding $10,000 with the Court of Federal Claims. Santa Monica does not, of course, dispute that the value of the airport property that it wishes to recover and use for other purposes exceeds $10,000.
Although the court chose the procedural route in making its decision, there appear to be relevant substantive grounds as well.
The internet has been abuzz lately with talk about the latest legal action filed by the City of Santa Monica (“City”) against the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), on October 31, 2013, seeking to avoid FAA’s refusal to allow the closure of Santa Monica Airport, see City of Santa Monica v. United States of America, et al., U.S.D.C. Case No. CV13-08046, an active general aviation airport surrounded by residential neighborhoods.
More specifically, the suit seeks to: (1) quiet title to the real property upon which the airport is now located, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, as having been owned in fee simple by the City since approximately 1926; (2) obtain a judicial declaration that any attempt by FAA to prevent closure interferes with the City’s constitutional obligations to protect the public health, safety and welfare and, thus, constitutes a “taking” without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The City bases this claim on its ownership of the airport property in fee simple, and any constraint on closure is “constructive confiscation of airport property, and, thus, a violation of the prohibition on takings with just compensation in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution;” (3) establish violation of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution brought about by FAA’s stepping outside the rights given to the federal government under Constitution, and incurring on the powers of protection of the public health, safety and welfare left to the states; and (4) establish violation of the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution arising from FAA’s contravention of its own regulatory guidance, which limits FAA’s power to restrict closure to those instances where FAA owned the property upon which the airport to be closed is located.
Leaving aside: (1) the difficulty of maintaining a case for inverse condemnation, or “taking” by one public entity against another where the express language of the Fifth Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation,” see, e.g., Complaint, ¶ 106 [emphasis added]; and (2) the hurdle of obtaining declaratory and injunctive relief as a remedy for unconstitutional taking, where the law is clear that monetary damages are the exclusive remedy, there are several attributes that make this case unique, and, thus, not a precedent for action by others seeking to close airports.
The Cities of Inglewood, Culver City and Ontario, California and the County of San Bernardino (“Cities/County”) joined together yesterday, May 30, 2013, to file a challenge to the recently approved Los Angeles International Airport (“LAX”) Specific Plan Amendment Study (“SPAS”) expansion project. The project includes: the further separation of runways on the North Airfield to allow access by A380s, B787s and other New Large Aircraft (“NLA”), as well as simultaneous approaches by other kinds of smaller, but no less impactful aircraft; addition of a new terminal; and a new off-airport transit center and people mover.
Cities/County’s action involves a challenge to the Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) for the project, on the grounds that, among other things, the EIR fails to adequately disclose the project’s admittedly significant air quality, aircraft noise and surface traffic impacts, or to provide adequate mitigation for those impacts, including a coherent plan to disperse air traffic demand to other regional airports, such as Ontario International Airport, now operating at only 30% of its optimal capacity. A copy of Cities/County’s Petition for Writ of Mandate may be obtained by clicking here.
Similar lawsuits were also filed by the SEIU United Service Workers West, a Union representing LAX service workers and Alliance for a Regional Solution to Airport Congestion (“ARSAC”), representing residents of communities in Westchester and Playa del Rey immediately to the north of the airport.
Cities Challenge Federal Aviation Administration Environmental Assessment for Conversion of Paine/Boeing Field to Commercial Airport
On January 31, 2013, the Cities of Mukilteo and Edmonds, Washington, and concerned citizens and organizations in the vicinity of Paine/Boeing Field, Everett, Washington (“Petitioners”) filed a “Petition for Review of Agency Order,” challenging the adequacy of the Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for the conversion of Paine Field from a proprietary facility to a commercial airport.
Petitioners’ challenge centers around the limited analysis contained in the EA. While the projects defined in the EA include the grant of Part 139 Operating Certificates for the airport and two airlines, Horizon and Allegiant, as well as the physical construction of various improvements to the terminal and other facilities, admittedly allowing virtually unlimited commercial aircraft operations, the analysis in the EA is limited to only the first phase of the ultimate project. It describes the environmental impacts of only a 22,000 square foot addition to the existing terminal, and the projected immediate operations of only the two named airlines, while it also acknowledges that, once a Part 139 Operating Certificate is issued for an airport, the law does not allow any limitation on access by any airline that desires such access. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 47521, et seq., (“Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990”).
Petitioners are represented by Buchalter Nemer, a firm with extensive experience in the fields of airport law, and environmental and land use law related to airport development.
Trucking industry challenges to the Port of Los Angeles’ pollution rules for trucks carrying cargo to and from the Port (“Clean Truck Program”) have hit the United States Supreme Court. The Court has agreed to accept certiorari to decide whether the rules that require, among other things, that trucking firms enter into agreements with the Port Authority of Los Angeles (“Port Authority”) to govern regular maintenance of trucks, off-street parking, and posting of identifying information are an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. Perhaps most contentious is the requirement that, ultimately, all truck operators must become employees of trucking companies, rather than acting as independent contractors.
The American Trucking Association originally challenged the Clean Truck Program on the grounds of a Federal law deregulating and preempting local authority “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Although the Port Authority has had surprising success in the lower courts thus far, the preemption provision relied upon by the trucking industry bears a substantial similarity, even identity, with the provisions in the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101, et seq. (“ADA”), which has rarely been successfully challenged.
On August 21, 2012, in a highly unusual disagreement with a rulemaking action by a Federal agency, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals sent the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) Cross-State Air Pollution, or Transport, Rule, governing sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) and oxides of nitrogen (“NOx”) emissions, back to the agency with firm instructions to try again, and, next time, do a better job. What makes this decision somewhat unusual is that cross-state rules had previously been implemented by EPA for PM2.5 and ozone, and upheld by the D.C. Circuit, see, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) and North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
In its decision in EME Homer City Generating, L.P., et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. 11-1302, the D.C. Circuit took strong issue with EPA’s attempt to meet its responsibility under Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), 49 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D). That section, the “good neighbor” provision, requires, in pertinent part, that, after EPA sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), 42 U.S.C. § 7409, and designates areas within each state which exceed the NAAQS, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d), or “nonattainment” areas, states must develop a state implementation plan (“SIP”), 42 U.S.C. § 7410, which includes provisions prohibiting any emissions source or activity “which will – contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other state with respect to any such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard.” The D.C. Circuit found major legal flaws in EPA’s Transport Rule.
On July 26, 2012, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania overturned a Pennsylvania statute preempting the right of local jurisdictions to impose land use restrictions on hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” within their boundaries. Unlike courts in the States of Ohio and Colorado, the court in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 2012 WL 3030277 (2012) held that the Pennsylvania statute violates the “basic precept that ‘land use restrictions designate districts in which only compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded.’” Id. at 15, quoting City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1995). Fracking involves the high pressure injection of water and sand carrying certain chemicals into rocks in which is concealed deposits of oil and gas. Residents near fracking sites have complained of, among other things, pollution of the underground water supply, and increasing instability and subsidence of structures undermined by the process. Supporters of the Pennsylvania law claimed that it provides the uniformity of regulation necessary for the successful continuation of Pennsylvania’s relatively new and profitable fracking industry. Critics, however, take the position that removing local restrictions on the fracking would be to undermine decades of rational development, and open the door to the “pig in the parlor” to which the Supreme Court referred in upholding local zoning originally in Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
The implication of these differences ranges far beyond Pennsylvania, because, among other reasons, the positions taken over local regulation of fracking do not differ notably from those taken with respect to local regulation of airport impacts.
A long simmering point of contention between State and Federal governments in the City of San Diego is the fate of the property now occupied by the United States Navy’s Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare Training Center in San Diego Bay. The issue is whether the Federal government, having decided that a 50 year extension of its existing lease over the property is not long enough, can extinguish California’s public tidelands trust rights, granted to the State upon its admission to statehood in 1850, through condemnation of 27.54 filled acres in perpetuity; or whether, as the State claims, California’s public trust rights reemerge if the property is subsequently sold to a private party. The question is of general importance, not only because many states hold public tidelands in trust, but also because the issue represents a test of the scope of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, and the doctrine of federal preemption that arises from it. On June 14, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals decided the question in United States of America v. 32.42 Acres of Land, No. 10-56568, D.C. No. 3:05-CV-01137-DMS-WMC (“California Lands”).Continue Reading...
On March 28, 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced their first settlement of an enforcement action addressing Federal Clean Air Act (“CAA”) violations in the marine engine manufacturing and ship building industries. Under that settlement, Coltec Industries, Inc. (“Coltec”) and National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (“National Steel”) have agreed to pay a civil penalty of $280,000 and spend approximately $500,000 on an environmental project to resolve alleged violations of the CAA and the EPA’s marine diesel engine air rules. Coltec is a subsidiary of EnPro Industries, Inc. and operates Fairbank Morse Engines which supplies marine propulsion and ship service systems to the United States Navy and Coast Guard. National Steel is a subsidiary of General Dynamics which designs and builds support ships, oil tankers and dry cargo carriers for the United States Navy and commercial markets.Continue Reading...
Challengers to the determinations of Federal agencies do not go to court on a level playing field with their governmental adversaries. Federal courts have long taken the position that deference is properly accorded to an agency making decisions within its area of technical expertise. That position may now be changing, at least with respect to two specific sets of legal circumstances.Continue Reading...
On March 20, 2012, in a far reaching opinion, the California Appellate Court for the Second District incurred into the territory usually occupied by the Federal Courts of Appeals, by holding that Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) safety standards, published in FAA Advisory Circular 150/5300-13 (“Advisory Circular”) do not preempt state tort law on the standard of care applicable to utilization of an airport’s “Runway Protection Zone” (“RPZ”).
The case, Sierra Pacific Holdings, Inc. v. County of Ventura, 2012 WL 920322 (Cal.App.2 Dist.)), concerns damage to an aircraft owned by Sierra Pacific Holdings, Inc. (“Sierra”), allegedly caused by a barrier erected within the RPZ at Camarillo Municipal Airport. The airport, owned and operated by Ventura County (“County”), erected the barrier for the apparent purpose of preventing runway incursions by police vehicles leasing space in part of the RPZ at the airport. The trial court upheld the County’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of state safety standards relating to “airport design and construction,” on the ground that Federal standards in the Advisory Circular preempt state tort law on the standard of care. The trial court’s holding was based on the Federal government’s “implied preemption” of safety standards at airports, and, thus, the foreclosure of Sierra’s negligence action based on a dangerous condition of public property under state tort law. Cal. Gov. Code § 835. The Appellate Court reversed on the ground that “Congress has not enacted an express preemption provision for FAA safety standards” and, thus, if preemption exists, it must be implied. The Appellate Court’s decision is flawed for at least two reasons.
Tinicum Township, Pennsylvania's Challenge to the Philadelphia International Airport Expansion Project Goes to Court
On Tuesday, March 6, 2012, Tinicum Township, Pennsylvania and its partners County of Delaware, Pennsylvania; Thomas J. Giancristoforo; and David McCann (“Petitioners”) took their grievances with the ongoing expansion project at Philadelphia International Airport (“PHL”) to the 3rd Circuit Federal Court of Appeals in Philadelphia. Petitioners, made up of communities and residents surrounding the airport, expressed their concern with the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) often-ignored failure to adequately disclose and analyze the project’s air quality and land use impacts.
Relying most heavily on consistent objections to the project by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) the Federal agency delegated by Congress with the power to promulgate and enforce regulations governing Clean Air Act compliance, Petitioners asserted that their claims are based on: (1) FAA’s failure to comply with the disclosure and analysis requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq., (“NEPA”); (2) the EPA’s right to receive deference from the Court to its negative views of the project because, in the 3rd Circuit, “deference follows delegation,” see, e.g., Chao v. Community Trust Company, 474 F.3d 75, 85 (3rd Cir. 2007); and (3) FAA’s violation of the Airport Airway Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 47101, et seq., (“AAIA”) requirement that airport projects be reasonably consistent with the existing plans of jurisdictions authorized by the State in which the airport is located to plan for the development of the area surrounding the airport. 49 U.S.C. § 47106(a)(1). FAA disagreed with Petitioners’ assertions of deference and claimed that they had complied with the AAIA by relying on the plans of the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission. (See Philadelphia Inquirer, March 6, 2012 and Delaware County Daily Times, March 7, 2012 for catalog of FAA arguments.)
The three judge panel expressed satisfaction with the scope of the oral argument, but is not subject to any specific time period within which to render its decision.
In National Association of Homebuilders, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al., 2011 W.L. 6118589 (December 9, 2011) (“Homebuilders”) the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has raised the bar for Article III standing in actions involving private petitioners or appellants. While recent years have seen a loosening of the standing requirements for states (see, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) [“This is a suit by a state for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the state has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, and all the earth and air within its domain”], and municipalities (see, e.g., City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 268 (2002) [“In this Circuit we have found standing for a city suing an arm of the Federal government when a harm to the City itself has been alleged” [emphasis added]], Homebuilders represents an escalation of the existing standing restrictions for individuals and organizations that represent them.
Article III of the United States Constitution “limits Federal Court jurisdiction to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ Those two words confine ‘the business of Federal Courts to questions represented in an adversary context and in a forum historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.’” Massachusetts, supra, 549 U.S. at 515, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). In order to establish Article III standing, “a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.” Massachusetts, supra, 549 U.S. at 517. In Homebuilders, the National Association of Homebuilders (“NAHB”), which represents a variety of individual developers, brought suit challenging the determination by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and United States Army Corps of Engineers (“ACOE”) that certain reaches of the Santa Cruz River in Arizona constitute “Traditional Navigable Waters” (“TNW”), thus subjecting those reaches to Federal regulation. The Court in Homebuilders rejected NAHB’s attempts to fit under the umbrellas of organizational, representational or procedural standing on the following grounds.
The proposed location of the first offshore wind farm, 130 wind turbines, each 440 feet tall, in a 25 square mile in Nantucket Sound, has been controversial from the start. The controversy has arisen partially because of Cape Cod’s high profile residents who would be visually impacted (such as the Kennedy family), and partly because of the proximity of the Town of Barnstable which is owner and operator of a municipal airport.
Now the courts have weighed into the controversy. In Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts v. Federal Aviation Administration, 2011 W.L. 5110119 (C.A.D.C.), decided on October 28, 2011, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that: (1) the petitioners in two consolidated cases, Barnstable and Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, had standing to challenge the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) determination that the wind farm would not pose a hazard to air navigation under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. Part 77; and (2) FAA’s finding of “no hazard” to air navigation under that section was a result of the agency’s failure to properly apply its own regulations and the guidance in its own Order JO 7400.2G (April 10, 2008) (“Handbook”).
Recent appellate cases have once again brought to the fore the critical importance of the “exhaustion of administrative remedies” for any potential challenger to an agency action based on noncompliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and other laws meant to protect the environment and public.
In California, as example, public projects such as road construction, airport development, and power facilities, as well as private projects such as shopping centers are challenged on the basis of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, or to present the alleged grounds of noncompliance “to the public agency orally or in writing . . . during the public comment period provided by this division or prior to the close of the public hearing . . .” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21177.
All too often, individuals, environmental organizations and public agencies wait to make their decisions to challenge the analysis of a project’s environmental impacts until their frustration peaks, and the time for filing a legal challenge arrives. [The usual time for filing a CEQA challenge is very short – 30 days from the filing by the agency of its Notice of Determination (“NOD”) which marks the final agency action in the CEQA process. NEPA is normally 60 days from the signing of the Record of Decision (“ROD”).] By that time, however, it is too late, because “exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintenance of a CEQA action.” Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, 124 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1199 (2004).
In what might be a surprising decision in any other Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling in Barnes v. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 10-70718, August 25, 2011, which, while narrow, begins the process of eroding both the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) long held position that “aviation activity . . . will increase at the same rate regardless of whether a new runway is built or not,” Barnes, at 16285, and the Federal Court’s traditional deference to it. City of Los Angeles v. FAA, 138 F.3d 806, 807-08, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1998).Continue Reading...
The National Resources Defense Council Challenge to the Southern California Air Quality Management District Administration of Emissions Credits Rejected by Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
In National Resources Defense Council v. Southern California Air Quality Management District, 2011 W.L. 2557246 (C.A. 9 (Cal.)), the National Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) sought to call the Southern California Air Quality Management District (“SCAQMD”) to account for purportedly using invalid “offsets” for emissions increases resulting from new stationary sources. A panel of the Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found, however, that: (1) the District Court’s decision refusing to hold SCAQMD to a validity standard for its internal “offsets” for emissions increases was correct because such a validity standard is not required by the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. section 7503(c) (“Section 173(c)”); and (2) ironically, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to reach that decision where original jurisdiction lies in the Courts of Appeals pursuant to CAA section 7607.Continue Reading...
In the midst of much debate as to whether a threat of “global warming” and “global climate change” actually exists and, if it does, further debate as to whether wind-generated energy would reduce carbon-dioxide emissions sufficiently to have a measurable impact on global temperatures, one thing is certain – wind farms are here, and more are planned. And, as with all forms of energy generation, the siting, construction and operation of wind farms present a number of Federal and local environmental and legal issues.
At the Federal level, wind farm projects may be subject to environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They may also be subject to challenge under the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Rivers and Harbors Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. (The Mineral Management Services (MMS) has authority to regulate alternative energy projects on the Outer Continental Shelf.) Other regulatory issues include Bureau of Land Management (BLM) policies for wind energy projects proposed for land managed by BLM, and U.S. Forest Service (USFS) special use permit requirements for wind energy projects proposed on USFS managed land. Wind farm projects proposed near airports or military airfields must be evaluated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to determine if they would be an obstruction or hazard to air navigation or interfere with surveillance radar. Wind farm projects can sometimes impact tribal rights.
Potential state and local issues include state environmental review, project siting, permitting and licensing, zoning and surrounding land uses, land leases and easements, turbine noise, vibration (“aerodynamic modulation”), shadow flicker, visual impacts and aesthetic concerns, perceived health effects of wind turbines, interference with electromagnetic transmissions (radio, television and cell phone signals) and claims for declines in tourism and property values. There can also be issues concerning technical requirements, safety, insurance and liabilities on the part of developers, landowners and operators.
These and other wind farm related issues are being litigated, and will continue to be litigated in increasing numbers, in state and Federal courts. The litigation ranges from a case pending in a North Dakota District Court, in which the City of Wishek is seeking to force a homeowner to remove a single wind turbine from his yard, to the 130-turbine Cape Wind project, located in waters five miles off Cape Cod and recently approved by the FAA and the Department of Interior, which opponents have vowed will “be in litigation for years.”
Chevalier Allen & Lichman LLP Files Brief in Second Circuit Challenging FAA's Decision Denying FBO at White Plains' Allegation of Economic Discrmination
On Thursday, April 22, 2010, Chevalier Allen & Lichman, LLP, on behalf of its client, 41 North 73 West, Inc. ("Avitat") filed a brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in support of it Petition for Review of the FAA's decision to deny Avitat's Part 16 Complaint which alleged that the proprietor of Westchester County Airport, the County of Westchester, had violated its Grant Assurances by allowing "light general aviation" FBOs to sell jet fuel in contravention of their leases. Avitat argues that the FAA's decision that the County had not violated Grant Assurances 22 (Economic Nondiscrimination), 23 (Exclusive Rights) and 24 (Fee and Rental Structure) was arbitrary and capricious.
On Friday, March 6, 2009, the Joint Petitioners in the East Coast Airspace Redesign case now pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, filed their Reply Brief, arguing that the FAA failed to comply with 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, the Clean Air Act and NEPA.
The Reply Brief takes the FAA to task for failing to consult with the state and local authorities regarding the tremendous impact that the Airspace Redesign will have on "4(f) properties," that is, state and local parks, and wildlife preserves. It also points out that the FAA is in violation of the Clean Air Act, because it failed to establish that the Airspace Redesign would conform with the Clean Air Act. Finally, the Reply Brief, argues that the FAA violated NEPA by not following its own regulations concerning aircraft noise in assessing the noise impacts of the Airspace Redesign.
Briefing for the case is now completed and oral argument is scheduled for 9:30 a.m.. on May 11, 2009, in front Judges Sentelle, Ginsburg, and Randolph at the E. Barrett Prettyman United States Courthouse, 333 Constitution Ave. NW, Washington, D.C.. Senators Dodd (D - Conn.) and Specter (R - Pa.) filed a amicus curiae brief supporting the Petitioners' Petition for Review to have the Airspace Redesign vacated and remanded back to the FAA. The New Jersey Attorney General, Anne Milgram also filed an amicus brief in support of the Petitioners.
Other Posts regarding this Litigation:
- FAA Files Its Brief in the East Coast Airspace Redesign Lawsuit, posted January 13, 2009
- New Jersey Attorney General Files Amicus Brief in the Airspace Redesign Litigation, posted September 12, 2008.
- Sens. Specter and Dodd File a Joint Amicus Brief in the East Coast Airspace Redesign Litigation, posted September 8, 2008.
- Petitioners' Opening Brief, posted September 3, 2008.
- Update of Airspace Redesign Litigation, posted April 28, 2008.
- Airspace Redesign May Not Reduce Fuel Consumption for the Airlines as FAA Claims, posted March 18, 2008
On February 3, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied a petition for review of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) “presumed to conform rule.” 72 Fed.Reg. 41565 (July 30, 2007).
Under the “presumed to conform rule” the FAA can avoid its obligation under the Clean Air Act to assure that its projects “conform to an implementation plan after it has been approved or promulgated under section 7410" of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. 7506(c). The FAA used its presumed to conform rule as one of the justifications for its failure to perform a conformity determination in the East Coast airspace redesign.
Although the Court found that the Petitioners did not have standing to bring the petition for review, the petition was successful in at least a couple regards. First, the decision was based on the predicate issue of standing, and did not reach the merits of the Petitioners’ argument that the FAA had not complied with federal law in the promulgation of its presumed to conform rule. Thus, that argument may be raised by the Petitioners in the East Coast airspace redesign litigation now pending before the D.C. Circuit.
Second, by bringing this case, Petitioners exhausted their legal remedies with respect to a "facial" challenge to the FAA's presumed to conform rule. The opinion in this case leaves the validity of the FAA’s presumed to conform rule on the table, ripe for the court’s consideration in the airspace redesign litigation.
That being said, the court’s opinion is not without error. For example, the court states that the “Petitioners challenge two recent FAA actions in which the FAA altered the air traffic control activities at airports . . .” Opinion, p.4. However, that, in fact, is not the case. As stated in the Petitioners’ brief, the issue was whether the FAA followed the rules set out by the EPA in 40 CFR 93.153 in promulgating its presumed to conform rule. By confusing the Petitioners’ facial challenge of the FAA’s presumed to conform rule for an “as applied” challenge, the court mistakenly applied incorrect facts and law to the matter that resulted in error in the outcome.
You can read the pleadings in this matter right here:
In addition, the EPA is revising the regulations governing conformity. They expect to issue new regulations in early 2009. A group of cities and concerned companies filed comments on the EPA’s proposed revisions and asked the EPA to eliminate the “presumed to conform” rule from the regulations.
Other blog posts on this topic:
- "FAA's Presumed to Conform Rule Will Affect Communities Around Airports." Posted August 8, 2008.
Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) Releases Notice of Preparation (NOP) of Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) for LAX Specific Plan Amendment Study (SPAS)
On March 12, 2008, Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) published the Notice of Preparation (NOP) of a Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) for the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) Specific Plan Amendment Study (SPAS) for public comment.
In early 2005, Chevalier Allen & Lichman, LLP (CA&L) participated in a legal challenge to LAWA’s approval of the LAX Master Plan, which proposed major changes to runways, taxiways and terminals at LAX. The challenge resulted in a Stipulated Settlement Agreement, under which LAWA agreed to, among other things, proceed with a SPAS to identify potential alternative designs, technologies and configurations at LAX. The Settlement Agreement also established the LAX SPAS Advisory Committee, on which CA&L’s clients, the Cities of Inglewood and Culver City, sit as members.
The NOP identifies five options for reconfiguring the North Airfield Complex at LAX. One of those options, moving Runway 6R/24L 340 feet to the north, has the potential in our view to adversely impact communities surrounding LAX. It is our further view that the runway movement 340 feet north has the clear potential to increase capacity (and, therefore, noise, air quality and surface traffic impacts) by allowing triple simultaneous arrivals on the north and south runways. The NOP does not comprehensively evaluate the potential for these impacts, nor does it evaluate the runway project in relation to the other Master Plan projects currently ongoing at LAX, such as construction of a mid-field terminal, with numerous additional aircraft gates. CA&L believes that this project could have impacts which are, at minimum, different from and potentially more intense than those projected to arise out of the previous project.
For these and other reasons, CA&L will submit comments on the proposed scope and content of the DEIR on behalf of its clients. We recommend that other interested parties submit their comments no later than June 18, 2008.
The LAX Master Plan, LAX Specific Plan and the Stipulated Settlement are available at http://www.laxmasterplan.org.